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communities, and predict behaviors in increasingly intrusive ways. But 
legal institutions have struggled to understand—let alone set limits 
on—new investigative methods and techniques for two major reasons. 
First, new surveillance technology tends to operate in opaque and 
unaccountable ways, augmenting police power while remaining free 
of meaningful oversight. Second, shifts in Fourth Amendment doctrine 
have expanded law enforcement’s ability to engage in surveillance 
relatively free of scrutiny by courts or by the public. The result is that 
modern policing is not highly visible to oversight institutions or the 
public and is becoming even less so. 
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In light of these informational dynamics, transparency litigation 
has become a core technique for rendering obscure investigative 
practices visible and holding police accountable. These new lawsuits 
form a criminal procedure “shadow docket”—they resolve important 
questions about democratic governance of policing without deciding 
on the constitutionality of searches and seizures. This Article builds on 
the government secrecy literature to explore the significance of this 
“shadow docket” and the relationship between transparency 
obligations and constitutional limits on police action. In the absence 
of meaningful Fourth Amendment safeguards, transparency litigation 
makes policing practices increasingly visible to the public and 
democratic institutions in areas where constitutional criminal 
procedure today has minimal reach. These efforts to make policing 
visible bear important lessons for advocates and scholars of criminal 
procedure, criminal justice reform, and transparency itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement has an opacity problem. 1  Police use sophisticated 
technologies to monitor individuals, surveil communities, and predict behaviors 
in increasingly intrusive ways. But legal institutions have struggled to 
understand—let alone set limits on—new investigative methods and techniques 
for two major reasons. First, new surveillance technology tends to operate in 
opaque and unaccountable ways, augmenting police power while remaining free 
of meaningful oversight. Second, shifts in Fourth Amendment doctrine have 
expanded law enforcement’s ability to engage in surveillance without oversight 
or scrutiny by courts or the public. 
Consider police use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) 
technology. ALPRs are cameras, often mounted at intersections or in police 
patrol cars, that photograph the license plates of passing vehicles and 
automatically screen them against a “hot list” of vehicles linked to crime.2 Using 
ALPRs, police can track a vehicle’s movements throughout a city over time—
creating a pervasive account of a car’s location. Critics have grown concerned 
that ALPRs appear to be used disproportionately in low-income and non-White 
communities.3 In one stunning example of an ALPR contributing to police error, 
 
 1. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 503, 504 (2018); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 911 (2006); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1108–14 
(2000); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1848–
50 (2015); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 187–96 (2008); 
Barry Friedman, Secret Policing, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 100–05; Heidi Kitrosser, “Macro-
Transparency” as Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
1163, 1199–1200 (2007) (examining programmatic national security secrecy); Catherine Crump, 
Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1606, 1629, 1640 (2016); Anil 
Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 69 (2014). 
 2. Tanvi Misra, Who’s Tracking Your License Plate?, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/12/automated-license-plate-readers-privacy-data-security-
police/576904/ [https://perma.cc/B3J3-3JPG]. 
 3. Dave Maass & Jeremy Gillula, What You Can Learn from Oakland's Raw ALPR Data, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-learned-
oakland-raw-alpr-data [https://perma.cc/67DK-YXJ6]; see also Ángel Díaz & Rachel Levinson-
Waldman, Automatic License Plate Readers: Legal Status and Policy Recommendations for Law 
Enforcement Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations 
[https://perma.cc/7WQ4-GDUJ] (“The NYPD has used license plate readers as part of its widespread 
surveillance of Muslim communities in the New York and New Jersey area.”). 
920 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:917 
police detained a Black family and forced them to lie on the ground after an 
ALPR flagged their minivan’s license plate as a match to a stolen motorcycle.4  
While it might be public knowledge that ALPRs exist, their particulars are 
often invisible to the public or oversight institutions. Civil society organizations 
and individuals concerned about the privacy and racial justice ramifications of 
ALPRs have turned to transparency law to uncover these practices. In 2015, the 
news outlet Ars Technica obtained 4.6 million ALPR records from the Oakland 
Police Department after filing a California open records request and then 
published a story about the privacy implications of license plate tracking.5 In 
Coral Gables, Florida, Raul Mas Canosa filed an open records request with the 
city seeking all the records it had on his car and then sued the city for violating 
his privacy rights.6 
The Constitution regulates policing primarily through the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement and prohibition of “unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”7 But courts have consistently held that the use of ALPRs is not a 
“search” and that defendants may not exclude evidence obtained through a 
license plate reader.8 Although police use of ALPRs is common knowledge—
scholars and press outlets have discussed the systems at length—drivers may 
never learn that their particular location has been tracked, unless they are 
ultimately charged with a crime and ALPR evidence is brought against them.9 
Modern policing depends on an array of techniques and technologies, like 
ALPRs, that are not considered “searches and seizures” and therefore lie outside 
 
 4. Teo Armus, Colorado Police Apologize over Viral Video of Officers Handcuffing Black 
Girls in a Mistaken Stop, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/04/aurora-pd-handcuffs-family-gunpoint/ 
[https://perma.cc/YX59-BQST].  
 5. Cyrus Farivar, We Know Where You’ve Been: Ars Acquires 4.6M License Plate Scans from 
the Cops, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 24, 2015), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/we-know-
where-youve-been-ars-acquires-4-6m-license-plate-scans-from-the-cops/ [https://perma.cc/6X5P-
CX34]. A similar set of records separately obtained from Oakland police demonstrated that the ALPRs 
were disproportionately used in low-income neighborhoods. See Maass & Gillula, supra note 3. 
 6. Emma Cueto, ‘Why Is My City Monitoring Me?,’ LAW360 (Dec. 1, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1223225/ [https://perma.cc/5RNX-5U3H]. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007) (collecting 
cases). 
 9. For general discussion of ALPRs, see Misra, supra note 2; Julia M. Brooks, Drawing the 
Lines: Regulation of Automatic License Plate Readers in Virginia, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2019); 
Lauren Fash, Automated License Plate Readers: The Difficult Balance of Solving Crime and Protecting 
Individual Privacy, 78 MD. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2019); Stephanie Foster, Should the Use of Automated 
License Plate Readers Constitute a Search After Carpenter v. United States?, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 221 
(2019); see also Amanda Levendowski, Trademarks as Surveillance Transparency, 36 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 15–20), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544195 [https://perma.cc/8R2X-ZW8F] 
(describing how federal trademark register discloses information about Vigilant Solutions’ ALPR 
systems). 
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of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.10 These practices are not subject to 
longstanding Fourth Amendment safeguards, including ex ante judicial review 
and the exclusionary rule. 11  Even surveillance techniques that might be 
considered “searches and seizures” often occur as part of “programmatic” and 
“suspicionless” police methodologies that are warrantless, data-driven, and not 
designed to generate convictions.12 Standing doctrine also shields many of these 
programs from legal challenges.13 
ALPRs also exemplify the significant consequences of police surveillance 
not just for individual rights, but also for public and democratic oversight. 
Sophisticated policing technologies such as large DNA databases, social media 
monitoring, and facial recognition are often implemented without robust 
oversight or public awareness.14 The result is that law enforcement techniques 
that rely on advanced technologies are often less visible to individual targets, the 
judicial branch, and the public than their physical counterparts.15 This relative 
secrecy impedes efforts to rein in law enforcement activities through legislative 
 
 10. See, e.g., Jeramie D. Scott, Social Media and Government Surveillance: The Case for Better 
Privacy Protections for Our Newest Public Space, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 151, 158–59 (2017) 
(describing how Fourth Amendment doctrine does not protect social media posts “knowingly 
expose[d]” to the public eye); Christopher L. Izant, Equal Access to Public Communications Data for 
Social Media Surveillance Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 242 (2017) (“There is no Fourth 
Amendment ‘search’ when the government views what a person makes public.”). 
 11. The exclusionary rule is the requirement that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures 
in violation of the Constitution” is inadmissible in court. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961). 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. See David Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
77, 89 (2018) (describing how stringent Fourth Amendment standing rules “have put many search and 
seizure methods; means; and programs beyond the reach of effective Fourth Amendment regulation”). 
 14. See, e.g., Kade Crockford, The FBI Is Tracking Our Faces in Secret. We’re Suing., ACLU 
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/the-fbi-is-tracking-our-faces-in-secret-
were-suing/ [https://perma.cc/S5CH-HWW3]; Caroline Haskins, Amazon Requires Police to Shill 
Surveillance Cameras in Secret Agreement, VICE (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mb88za/amazon-requires-police-to-shill-surveillance-cameras-in-
secret-agreement [https://perma.cc/5QHX-H8BE]; Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might 
End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html 
[https://perma.cc/BJV8-JF4K]. 
 15. This dynamic is partly attributable to the unique set of rules that constrains transparency of 
digital searches. See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Exposing Secret Searches: A First Amendment Right 
of Access to Electronic Surveillance Orders, 93 WASH. L. REV. 145, 153 (2018) (“Routine sealing of 
court records . . . implicates the public’s right of access to judicial records and proceedings.”); Stephen 
Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
313, 322–26 (2012) (discussing existing statutory provisions in Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
that foster electronic surveillance secrecy). It is also partly due to the political economy of surveillance 
technology. As Julie Cohen notes, “As digital technologies and capabilities furnished to the government 
by private contractors have become more central to national security and law enforcement operations, 
both the privileged status of trade secrets and the legal justifications asserted for protecting secrecy have 
changed.” JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 133 (2019). 
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or administrative oversight, litigation, and policymaking. 16  In other words, 
doctrinal and technological developments yield distinctive informational 
dynamics: even as law enforcement expands the amount and types of information 
they collect about communities and individuals, the public and other 
stakeholders have remained comparatively in the dark about these practices. In 
light of these changes, transparency litigation has taken on a newly significant 
role in revealing investigative practices, stimulating public debate, and fostering 
meaningful democratic oversight. 
Today, both formally and informally, many disputes about policing are 
about transparency. Transparency litigation, by which I mean litigation to 
compel the disclosure of government records, has become a core technique for 
rendering obscure investigative practices visible and holding police 
accountable. 17  These lawsuits form a sort of criminal procedure “shadow 
docket.” Although transparency litigation does not determine the merits of any 
law enforcement practice, program, or technology, these cases are nonetheless 
of central importance to criminal procedure and policing because they shape the 
conditions for institutional oversight, policy changes, and public resistance. 
Therefore, transparency litigation helps to resolve important questions about the 
democratic governance of policing without deciding on the constitutionality of 
searches and seizures.18 
Accordingly, transparency litigation is not the primary mechanism through 
which the courts directly constrain criminal procedure or policing. Nonetheless, 
as this Article demonstrates, this docket meaningfully influences the protection 
of Fourth Amendment rights and values by rendering policing increasingly 
 
 16. Although the dominant strain of criminal procedure scholarship was long focused on the 
scope of constitutional rights, modern approaches are shifting to consider how other institutions might 
promote these and other values outside of the courts and outside of the “conventional paradigm” of 
constitutional law. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 781 (2012) 
(“[L]egal scholars considering the problem of policing . . . overwhelmingly take constitutional law to be 
their method . . . .”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1128–29 (1996) (“Not all sensible rules of criminal procedure can or should 
be constitutionalized.”). 
 17. This litigation often takes the form of statutory open records or First Amendment lawsuits 
brought by journalists, news organizations, civil society organizations, or movement activists. See infra 
Part III; see also Jonathan Manes, Secrecy & Evasion in Police Surveillance Technology, 34 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 503, 512 (2019) (“Until there is a critical mass of public disclosure and public awareness, 
courts and legislatures generally do not publicly weigh in on the constitutional or statutory limits on the 
police’s use of the novel technology.”). 
 18. Other commentators have used the term “shadow docket” to denote the Supreme Court’s 
non-merits orders and summary decisions, which do not resolve the merits of disputes but nonetheless 
have significant and enduring legal implications. William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s 
Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 4–5 (2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s non-merits 
rulings as a “shadow docket” worthy of study); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the 
Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019); Steve Vladeck, Symposium: The Solicitor General, the 
Shadow Docket and the Kennedy Effect, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 22, 2020), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-the-solicitor-general-the-shadow-docket-and-the-
kennedy-effect/ [https://perma.cc/49KS-6KQX] (suggesting that the “shadow docket” “record[s] 
everything other than the justices’ formal rulings in argued cases”). 
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visible to the public and democratic institutions. Indeed, transparency law is 
often now a critical advocacy tool for those seeking to hold law enforcement 
accountable and a critical component of efforts to shift public opinion, 
complementing the work of courts and oversight institutions. These efforts to 
stop intrusive policing practices are vital complements to traditional Fourth 
Amendment remedies and the relief available under civil rights law. 
This Article’s focus on democratic accountability brings together two 
distinct literatures considering the promise—and pitfalls—of broadening general 
public participation in and access to government. First, this Article links the 
secrecy and opacity of surveillance methods and practices to the burgeoning 
scholarly literature that proposes ways of making police more accountable and 
more democratic—including by abolishing, defunding, or stripping police of 
their power and resources. 19  Amidst a nationwide uprising against police 
violence and oppression in 2020, movements and advocates have called for 
dramatic changes to policing. Some transparency-oriented reforms have already 
taken place, and others are underway.20 
Second, policing also provides a new context for considering how the 
visibility of controversial government practices impacts democratic self-
governance. In particular, the critical role of law enforcement transparency 
litigation is a modest counterargument to progressive critics of “open 
government” concerned that “transparency” is a thinly-veiled effort to weaken 
programs and agencies designed to promote the public welfare, promoting 
“reactionary” and regressive politics.21 But shining an unflinching light on the 
perils and failures of twenty-first century policing is consistent with the 
movements’ political inclinations to dismantle or substantially reduce law 
 
 19. See infra Part I.B. 
 20. See Eric Umansky, We’re Publishing Thousands of Police Discipline Records That New 
York Kept Secret for Decades, PROPUBLICA (July 26, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/nypd-
civilian-complaint-review-board-editors-note [https://perma.cc/EKN9-QZFN]; Saja Hindi, Colorado 
Among First in U.S. to Pass Historic Police Reforms Following Protests, DENVER POST (June 13, 2020), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2020/06/13/colorado-police-reform-bill-passes-legislature/ 
[https://perma.cc/KY7R-MEDH]; Angel Idowu, #ReleaseTheRecords Movement Seeks Release of 
Police Misconduct Files, WTTW NEWS (July 23, 2020), 
https://news.wttw.com/2020/07/23/releasetherecords-movement-seeks-release-police-misconduct-files 
[https://perma.cc/ETZ3-UD67]; Kyle Wiggers, NYC Passes POST Act, Requiring Police Department 
to Reveal Surveillance Technologies, VENTUREBEAT (June 18, 2020), 
https://venturebeat.com/2020/06/18/new-york-city-council-passes-law-requiring-nypd-to-reveal-its-
surveillance-technologies/ [https://perma.cc/38FW-YABC]. 
 21. David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2017) [hereinafter Freedom of Information]; David E. Pozen, Transparency’s 
Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 151 (2018) [hereinafter Ideological Drift] (arguing that the 
Freedom of Information Act aggravates a “mounting adversarialism” between government and public); 
Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 932 (2006) (expressing skepticism 
that open government laws can address “populist fears of secrecy, especially those that are deep-seated 
and lead to an all-encompassing distrust of the political order”). 
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enforcement power.22 Examining the uses of transparency law and litigation in 
the context of law enforcement highlights the systemic importance of 
information—or the lack thereof—on efforts to change, curb, or altogether cease 
policing practices. And it underscores the integral role of contestation, resistance 
to authority, and “agonistic participation” in government institutions while 
acknowledging the potentially serious costs of those forms of participation to 
legitimacy.23 
As the nation continues to reckon with police violence toward Black 
individuals and communities, changes to police surveillance and investigative 
tactics are overdue. As Devon Carbado has written, the law of police 
investigations shapes law enforcement’s interactions with the public and can lead 
to brutality, oppression, and violence.24 The deaths of George Floyd, Breonna 
Taylor, Atatiana Jefferson, Eric Garner, Philando Castile, Alton Sterling, 
Michael Brown, Terence Crutcher, Keith Lamont Scott, Deborah Danner, Walter 
Scott, Laquan McDonald, Akai Gurley, John Crawford III, and countless others 
killed by police show that lives are very much at stake. Quantification, data-
driven tools, and predictive techniques are reshaping policing, but killings, 
brutality, and misconduct remain. 25  Substantial informational asymmetries 
confront organizers, advocates, and legal institutions who seek to change 
policing: police agencies often fight to conceal their technologies from the public 
and oversight institutions.26  
But new police technology also creates new opportunities for transparency. 
Police technology entails reams of data and large numbers of government 
records: vendor proposals, contracts, training manuals, frequently asked 
questions, and many more artifacts. When it comes to transparency, police 
technology has two faces: it can conceal and expose information vital to both 
accountability and oversight.27 The result is that, while policing may be more 
secretive than in past eras, changes in policing practice may also have made 
transparency litigation a more feasible accountability strategy. 
 
 22. Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 408 (2018) 
(emphasizing the Movement for Black Lives’ focus on “shrinking the space of governance now reserved 
for policing, surveillance, and mass incarceration”). 
 23. Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1613 (2017). 
 24. Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth 
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 131 (2017) (“Fourth Amendment 
doctrine expressly authorizes or facilitates the very social practice it ought to prevent: racial profiling. 
This authorization and facilitation exposes African Americans not only to the violence of frequent police 
contact but also to the violence of police killings and physical abuse.”). 
 25. See Aaron Shapiro, Predictive Policing for Reform? Indeterminacy and Intervention in Big 
Data Policing, 17 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 456, 460–61 (2019) (describing how police agencies view 
predictive policing as a reformist tool). 
 26. See also Manes, supra note 17. 
 27.  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue Data, 72 VAND. 
L. REV. 561, 567–68 (2019) (“New data surveillance systems built by the police can also be used to 
monitor systemic and recurring police practices.”). 
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This Article makes three contributions. First, it demonstrates how doctrinal 
and technological changes have exacerbated obstacles to transparency and have 
made it increasingly difficult to check policing.28 Second, this Article observes 
that the informational dynamics of modern policing affect the efficacy of 
oversight institutions and community control mechanisms alike. While 
transparency law is increasingly fueling advocacy efforts by movement groups 
and grassroots organizations, it has also become a critical tool for formal 
institutions engaged in monitoring and oversight. 
Finally, this Article considers the lessons these informational dynamics 
bring to efforts to reform police governance. Transparency values lie at the core 
of procedural justice and democratic policing, two approaches intended to repair 
the “legitimacy” of criminal law enforcement institutions. Transparency is 
equally essential to the progressive and abolitionist project of recentering 
affected communities in control and oversight of policing. By relying on open 
government tools, reformers seek to shed light on criminal law enforcement 
institutions in the interests of promoting community control and accountability.29 
Examining these efforts provides a modest rejoinder to those who are skeptical 
about the value of transparency and “open government” to democratic 
governance and public trust.30 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I begins by briefly reviewing how 
scholars have invoked openness values in constitutional law and criminal 
procedure. Part II highlights how Fourth Amendment doctrine can promote 
information-forcing and sets forth how the shift from an individualist, warrant-
based model of policing toward a programmatic, reasonableness-based model 
 
 28. Policing is not the only context in which advocates have looked to transparency law in the 
absence of standing. Similar moves are visible in settings as disparate as voting rights, reproductive 
rights, immigration, and national security. This Article saves for another day, however, a fuller analysis 
of the ways in which onerous standing and pleading requirements, barriers to discovery, and other 
impediments to relief have led advocates to turn to transparency law as the initial part of a “two-step 
litigation” strategy. 
 29. See, e.g., Dan Sloan, A World Without Prisons: A Conversation with Mariame Kaba, 
LUMPEN MAGAZINE (Apr. 7, 2016) 
http://web.archive.org/web/20190503093113/http://www.lumpenmagazine.org/a-world-without-
prisons-a-conversation-with-mariame-kaba/ (“Transparency does help very much to give the 
community tools and information that they need to advocate for themselves and their kids around these 
issues.”); Stops, Transparency, Oversight and Protection Act (STOP Act), WE CHARGE GENOCIDE, 
http://wechargegenocide.org/stop.act/ [https://perma.cc/A2S9-FWRZ] (calling for the passage of the 
Stops, Transparency, Oversight and Protection Act (STOP Act) to require Chicago police to share data 
on stops); Right to Know Act, CMTYS. UNITED FOR POLICE REFORM, 
https://www.changethenypd.org/RightToKnowAct [https://perma.cc/FTF4-QRTA] (calling for the 
passage of the Right to Know Act to require NYPD to identify themselves and articulate a reason for a 
stop or other civilian encounter). 
 30. See, e.g., Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 151 (illustrating that declining trust in 
institutions may be related to demands for more transparency); Fenster, supra note 21, at 949 
(“Transparency advocates’ failure to recognize the impossibility of achieving perfect democratic 
governance and a thoroughly informed and engaged public results in a frustrating and often ineffective 
legal regime.”). 
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has strained law enforcement transparency. Part III documents how, in response 
to the erosion of procedural and substantive Fourth Amendment protections, 
current efforts to reform policing draw on both the formal mechanisms of 
transparency litigation and the animating values of transparency law—
democratic self-governance, participation, and accountability. Part IV considers 
the normative benefits and potential drawbacks of relying on transparency’s 
“shadow docket” to advance the law of policing. Part V explores lessons for 
reform efforts to improve law enforcement transparency and oversight. 
I. 
TRANSPARENCY AND CHECKABILITY 
To contextualize the informational dynamics that afflict policing, this 
Section begins by surveying how constitutional theorists have justified openness 
and transparency as essential qualities of democratic governance. Despite the 
controversial nature of open government mandates, advocates for criminal law 
enforcement reform have embraced principles of transparency and open 
government as central to the project of democratizing police. 
A. Information as Political Check 
The assumption that openness in government is critical to democracy runs 
deep throughout democratic theory and constitutional law.31 At least in theory, 
the flow of information from the government to the public is a key aspect of 
popular sovereignty. 32  But informational flow within government might be 
equally significant. As Heidi Kitrosser has described it, one might envision 
secrecy as existing along a “spectrum” that can signal whether a secret is more 
or less troubling to democratic norms.33 In David Pozen’s terminology, a secret 
is “deep” if government actors work to “conceal[] its existence from the public 
and from other officials,” frustrating both public oversight and checks and 
balances.34 On the other end of the spectrum, a secret is “shallow” if “ordinary 
citizens understand they are being denied relevant information and have some 
ability to estimate its content.”35 To understand the depth of a secret, one might 
 
 31. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 21, at 898 (describing theoretical and political assumptions 
“that the publicity of open government produces an informed and interested public, and by implication, 
that secrecy caused by opaque or closed government produces suspicious and/or ignorant masses”); 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1168 (2017) 
(“Improved transparency leads to increased accountability.”). 
 32. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 489, 515 (2007). But see, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of 
Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 
249, 251–52 (2004) (describing the Court’s “erratic and fragmented” approach to newsgathering). 
 33. Kitrosser, supra note 32, at 514. 
 34. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 274 (2010). 
 35. Id. 
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consider whether the policy of secrecy is, itself, visible, politically accountable, 
and reversible.36 
The “deep/shallow” distinction is important not just to the public but also 
to interbranch oversight. As Kitrosser has put it, a “shallow” secret is more likely 
to be conducive to “political[] checkability,” because a legislature is more 
capable of exercising political control over secrets that it knows exists. 37 
Publicity about government policy choices might also promote legislative 
oversight indirectly by stimulating constituent concerns 38  or prompting 
investigative reporting 39  that leads to legislative oversight. 40  “Shallowness” 
does not, standing alone, ensure that legislative controls will prove effective, but 
it is a necessary precondition for oversight.41 Accordingly, determining what 
kinds of information ought to be disclosed, to whom, and when, has 
constitutional implications.42 
What Kitrosser calls “openness legislation”—statutory interventions that 
promote informational flow either among the branches or between the 
 
 36. Kitrosser, supra note 32, at 515. 
 37. Id. Kitrosser thus concluded that the executive branch should be permitted to operate in 
secret, subject to any statutory limitations enacted by Congress. Id. at 528. 
 38. See, e.g., Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Giving Others a Voice in Congress, One Hand-
Delivered Letter at a Time, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/us/politics/herd-on-the-hill-constituent-outreach.html 
[https://perma.cc/AJJ3-7QB9] (explaining that an organization of 300 volunteers “deliver[ed] more than 
12,000 letters to congressional offices on behalf of constituents seeking to inject a human element into 
the issues roiling the country”). 
 39. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Jesse Drucker, Lawmakers Increase Criticism of ‘Opportunity Zone’ 
Tax Break, N.Y. Times (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/business/opportunity-
zones-congress-criticism.html [https://perma.cc/DG9L-G3YA] (“Congressional Democrats are calling 
for investigations and legislative fixes in the wake of reporting by The [New York] Times.”). 
 40. According to this theory, a lack of information is partly to blame for historically anemic 
congressional oversight of controversial executive branch national security programs, such as 
programmatic communications surveillance, rendition and detention, and blacklisting of travelers. See 
Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information 
Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2008) (discussing Bush Administration’s notification of the 
“Gang of Eight” regarding warrantless wiretapping); Jenny-Brooke Condon, Illegal Secrets, 91 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1099, 1115 (2014) (warrantless wiretapping); Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the 
Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007); Ian MacDougall, Note, 
CIPA Creep: The Classified Information Procedures Act and Its Drift into Civil National Security 
Litigation, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 668, 699 (2014) (discussing no-fly list litigation); Justin 
Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2148 (2006). 
 41. See Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1931, 1951 (2007) (describing the state secrets privilege as an attempt to “narrow federal 
jurisdiction” and simultaneously deprive Congress and the courts of authority to regulate government 
secrecy). 
 42. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 32; Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 241 (2015); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and 
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909 (2006); Jonathan Hafetz, A Problem of 
Standards?: Another Perspective on Secret Law, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2141 (2016); Jonathan 
Manes, Secret Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 803 (2018). 
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government and the people—plays a critical role in promoting checkability.43 
“Open government” statutes that require government entities to disclose records, 
such as the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and its state equivalents, 
are paradigmatic examples of openness legislation.44 These statutes generally 
create a presumption that government records should be disclosed to a member 
of the public upon request, exempt certain categories from disclosure, and create 
a private right of action that permits individuals to enforce these mandates.45 
“Open government” statutes are polarizing. Critics of these statutory 
frameworks charge that “open government” principles do little to promote 
accountability for government practices but rather tend to empower moneyed 
interests, undercut the legitimacy of the state, and devalue personal privacy.46 
As Mark Fenster argues, transparency advocates often rely upon a “deeply 
populist” vision of the state, one in which “a distant, secretive bureaucracy rules 
the nontransparent state” in ways that are estranged from the popular will.47 And 
the evidence that open government obligations across a broad array of areas 
have, in fact, improved governance is scant.48 Instead of fostering oversight by 
investigative journalists and civil society, open government laws have invited 
business lobbyists into the legislative and administrative state. They have 
permitted right-wing organizations to “reframe facts, obscure the overall shape 
of government activity, and sow alienation.” 49  In their current form, critics 
contend, transparency obligations are not only unnecessary to advance a 
reformist agenda but are in fact sometimes counterproductive, serving neoliberal 
ends. 50  These critics also doubt that “open government” and freedom of 
information can meaningfully check the most egregious forms of secrecy.51 
 
 43. Kitrosser, supra note 32, at 514 (explaining that openness obligations are “antagonistic” to 
deep secrecy and conducive to checkability). 
 44. Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 118 (describing FOIA as the “canonical” 
openness legislation). 
 45. Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra note 21, 1102–03. 
 46. See Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 123 (“In its actual application, however, 
transparency has become increasingly associated with institutional incapacity and with agendas that seek 
to maximize market freedom and shrink the state.”); see also Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: 
Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 628 (2010) (“[T]ransparency . . . offers a highly 
charged metaphor of a corrupt, secretive state that must be made visible.”); Julie E. Cohen, The Inverse 
Relationship Between Secrecy and Privacy, 77 SOC. RSCH. 883, 890–91 (2010) (observing that ideals 
of “openness” underwrite corporate surveillance and monetization of personal information); Kate 
Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839, 854 (2019) (recognizing many scholars “have 
argued that there are serious tradeoffs that come with overreliance on visibility”). 
 47. Fenster, supra note 46, at 629. 
 48. See Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 127–32. 
 49. Id. at 149–50. 
 50. Id. at 147–48. 
 51. Id. at 155–56 (“[E]ven as the transparency laws of the 1960s and 1970s placed increasingly 
onerous demands on the domestic policy process, they grew increasingly detached from the state’s most 
violent and least visible components.”). 
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B. Law Enforcement Transparency 
Strikingly, though, advocates of reforming law enforcement and criminal 
justice institutions appear not to share these doubts. 52  Calls for police 
transparency make headlines on a regular basis.53 Advocacy groups and reporters 
painstakingly reconstruct details of police-union contracts54 and use-of-force 
incidents.55 Civil society organizations demand statutory changes to promote 
transparency in police-civilian encounters, surveillance oversight, and body-
camera law.56 Scholars have embraced these calls, situating transparency as a 
central pillar in efforts to promote public trust in law enforcement, police 
accountability, and compliance with the law itself. 
Contemporary theories about how to improve policing and reduce its 
footprint in American communities reflect growing and shared commitments to 
transparency as a potential remedy for law enforcement’s precarious relationship 
with the public.57 Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, for instance, argue 
 
 52. Kate Levine is a notable exception and has argued that the focus on transparency and 
disclosure for police disciplinary records is misplaced. See Levine, supra note 46, at 846. 
 53. See, e.g., Jodi S. Cohen & Jennifer Smith Richards, Police Oversight Ordinance Promised 
Transparency but Doesn’t Fully Deliver, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/copa-chicago-police-oversight#:~:text=Accountability  
[https://perma.cc/VDR2-Y3T6]; Editorial, Charlotte’s Mayor, City Council Need to Answer These 
Questions About Police Shooting Video, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/editorials/article229534219.html [https://perma.cc/MGR9-
EEUV]; Editorial, More Police Transparency Can Repair Public Distrust, NEWS-TIMES (May 18, 
2019), https://www.newstimes.com/opinion/article/Editorial-More-police-transparency-can-repair-
13854753.php [https://perma.cc/QTF9-CTVD]; Christian Morrow, Wolf Vetoes Bill That Would Bar 
Identifying Police, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER, Nov. 23, 2016, at A1, A5, 
https://newpittsburghcourier.com/2016/11/23/wolf-vetoes-bill-that-would-bar-identifying-police/ 
[https://perma.cc/A8QR-5BZW]; Robert Mackey, Charlotte Police Chief Refuses to Release Dashcam 
Video of Officer Killing Keith Scott, INTERCEPT (Sept. 22, 2016), 
https://theintercept.com/2016/09/22/charlotte-police-chief-refuses-to-release-dashcam-video-of-
officer-killing-keith-scott/ [https://perma.cc/57TK-9CRP]. 
 54. See, e.g., Police Union Contract Project, CHECK THE POLICE, 
https://www.checkthepolice.org/ [https://perma.cc/J47P-VNFJ]. 
 55. See, e.g., WASH. POST: FATAL FORCE (2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/policeshootings [https://perma.cc/C5LQ-3K5H]. 
 56. See Wiggers, supra note 20; Right to Know Act, supra note 29. 
 57. See infra Part IV.B. There is a large literature on police transparency, but it largely does not 
address the secrecy of investigative methods. Many scholars have called for additional transparency for 
police as people, noting the urgent need for more accountability for police misconduct. See, e.g., Cynthia 
H. Conti-Cook, A New Balance: Weighing Harms of Hiding Police Misconduct Information from the 
Public, 22 CUNY L. REV. 148 (2019); Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Open Data Policing, 106 GEO. L.J. 
ONLINE 1 (2017); Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953 (2017); Rachel Moran, 
Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837 (2016); see also Levine, supra note 46. Others 
have focused on the uniquely deferential treatment afforded to police agencies in comparison to other 
democratic institutions, noting that police seem to enjoy a string of exceptions to general obligations of 
transparency, accountability, and oversight. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1; Daphna 
Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (2016); Erik 
Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000); Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption 
of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (2017); see also Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 
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that “democratic policing” requires that the legal authorities which constrain 
other agencies also apply to police.58 Transparency obligations are no exception. 
Proponents of procedural justice see transparency in large part as an important 
instrument for attaining public trust. 59  Still others have considered broader 
extensions of transparency, including within the grand jury, bail, trial, 
sentencing, and plea-bargaining systems, to permit a broader set of actors 
(beyond the parties, attorneys, and judges) to oversee or participate in criminal 
justice processes.60 
But while a growing consensus supports more transparent policing as a 
matter of policy, it has largely failed to grapple with the ways in which new 
technologies and doctrinal shifts undermine those efforts by permitting—and 
sometimes encouraging—widespread investigative secrecy. 61  These 
informational dynamics reflect a fundamental challenge to police reform and to 
the democratic legitimacy of policing decisions. Obtaining information about 
what the police are doing—the tools they are using, the practices they are 
engaged in, and the limits of their activities—is a fundamental predicate to 
ensuring that the promise of democratic control (whether by courts, legislatures, 
other formal oversight institutions, civil society, social movements, or individual 
defendants) is real.  
II. 
POLICY VISIBILITY IN CONTEXT 
While today secrecy norms appear embedded in law enforcement culture 
and practice, for decades, law enforcement routinely disclosed fairly extensive 
information about how police investigated crime. Longstanding Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and practice embrace a variety of “information-forcing” 
 
54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 216–17 (2013) (describing two different situations where law enforcement 
agencies enjoy “privileged legal status”). 
 58. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1, at 1848–49 (describing various types of police 
obfuscation and evasion of transparency). 
 59. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural 
Justice, 123 YALE L.J.F. 525, 535 (2014) (“Many judges devote their attention to being fair, i.e., to 
correctly applying the law to the facts of each case, but do not think about how they can communicate 
that they are being fair to the parties in the case or to the public more generally.”). 
 60. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 2173 (2014); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (2016); Jocelyn Simonson, 
Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559 (2016); 
Lauren M. Ouziel, Prosecution in Public, Prosecution in Private (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author); Jenia I. Turner, Transparency in Plea Bargaining, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973 (2021); Laura 
I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297 (2012); Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731 (2010); Andrea 
Kupfer Schneider & Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark: The Need for Transparency and Data in 
Plea Bargaining, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 434 (2019). 
 61. Cf. Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119 
(2013) (considering efforts to prompt law enforcement to produce, collect, and share data about 
policing). 
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mechanisms, most notably through the requirement to obtain a search warrant 
and give notice to the target of a search.62 The erosion of these requirements has 
had significant and well-documented effects on individual privacy and on non-
White communities.63 The impact on transparency and democratic governance, 
however, has been relatively underappreciated. Diminished Fourth Amendment 
protections have also made it much more difficult for courts, defendants, and the 
public to get critical information necessary to check the police. The hypothetical 
scenarios that follow illustrate these shifts and demonstrate how parallel 
evolutions in legal doctrine and in law enforcement practice have created 
opportunities for law enforcement to act in secret, yielding substantial 
transparency gaps. 
A. Three Policing Scenarios 
The “canonical fact pattern[s]” of criminal procedure involve discrete, 
physical encounters between individuals and law enforcement.64 Likewise, the 
canonical Fourth Amendment cases primarily involve individual defendants 
seeking to suppress evidence that was gleaned from an allegedly unlawful search 
or seizure65 or individual plaintiffs seeking relief for an unconstitutional harm.66 
 
 62. “Information forcing” is often linked to contract theory. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 
99–100 (1989) (discussing how information asymmetries can lead to inefficient and suboptimal 
contracting outcomes); Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 501–03 
(2008) (discussing information-forcing contracting rules in the context of Hadley v. Baxendale). But 
discussions of information-forcing have found their way into other areas of the law as well, including 
criminal procedure. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1407, 1479 (2011) (“In the criminal procedure context law enforcement officers and agencies are 
sophisticated repeat players in the best position to collect, aggregate and report data and rationales.”); 
see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 861 (2006) (environmental law); Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2012) (pleading standards); Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The 
Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2017) 
(multidistrict litigation). 
 63. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means 
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 659 (1994) (“[B]eing stopped for nothing—or almost nothing—
has become an all-too-common experience for some Americans since 1968, when the United States 
Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio.”); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 333, 364–65 (1998) (noting that the Terry Court was “troubled” by the racial impact of stop and 
frisk, although it ultimately blessed the practice). 
 64. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536 (2005); 
see also Renan, supra note 57, at 1051 (“Modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence developed around 
a transactional conception of the police-citizen encounter that, in turn, framed the legal tests governing 
search and seizure.”). 
 65. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 66. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 364 (2009) (describing 
Section 1983 action against school district for strip search of thirteen-year-old girl); City of Ontario v. 
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 746 (2010) (describing Section 1983 action against city and police department for 
reviewing text messages received on official pager); Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989) 
(describing Section 1983 action against county police for roadblock that killed a suspect); see also Floyd 
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Yet this doctrinal orientation toward individual rights sometimes overlooks more 
basic questions about what different actors involved with law enforcement 
investigations know about policing. The presumption of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine is that individuals know when their persons, houses, papers, or effects 
are searched, that courts have an opportunity to weigh in on the constitutionality 
of a search, and that the legislature can respond to intrusive police conduct by 
enacting laws that constrain police investigations. As these scenarios 
demonstrate, these presumptions are not always supported. 
1. Scenario 1. 
An undercover police officer investigating you for participating in a fraud 
conspiracy visits your office under false pretenses while you are out. Telling the 
receptionist that they are a friend, they rifle through your papers and, 
unbeknownst to you, steal several documents. Six months later, the police apply 
for a warrant to search your office for “letters, papers, documents, and writings” 
relating to the conspiracy.67 When the undercover officer testifies before the 
grand jury, you find out about the secret theft of the documents. 
The undercover officer’s conduct was not only a search: for a time, it was 
also a secret.68 Because the officer did not apply for a warrant, law enforcement 
did not inform, much less seek the approval of, a “neutral and detached 
magistrate” before performing the search.69 Nor did the officer leave notice or 
an inventory behind them, which would have permitted you to know that the 
search took place and that documents were taken. But the search did not stay a 
secret for long: you eventually found out because the officer’s testimony was 
critical to the criminal case against you. 
2. Scenario 2. 
An urban police department engages in a pattern of stopping, questioning, 
and frisking individuals based on reasonable suspicion that they are engaged in 
crime, are about to engage in crime, or are armed and dangerous. The stops occur 
in public, often with witnesses present.70 It is common knowledge that thousands 
of people are stopped and frisked each year and that only a small proportion of 
those stopped are ultimately arrested on any charge. When asked to release the 
aggregate data on the stop-and-frisk program, which would include demographic 
 
v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing Section 1983 action against 
New York for unlawful stop-and-frisk policy). 
 67. Gouled v. United States, 264 F. 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1920), certifying questions to 255 U.S. 
209 (1921). 
 68. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 209, 305 (1921). 
 69. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
 70. Nicholas K. Peart, Opinion, Why Is the N.Y.P.D. After Me?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/young-black-and-frisked-by-the-nypd.html 
[https://perma.cc/W2PD-MDGQ]. 
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information about the individuals stopped, the reasons for stops, and the 
locations of stops, the police decline to do so.71 
The stop-and-frisk program is not a secret.72 Individuals obviously know 
that they have been stopped, questioned, and frisked; those who have not had 
such encounters with the police often know somebody who has. Communities, 
civil society organizations, and social movements coalesce around protesting the 
practice. But while stop-and-frisk is no secret, it still is not transparent. The data 
that police refuse to produce would provide information critical to understanding 
how the program functions and how it might produce or rely upon racial bias. 
That data is essential for meaningful oversight by city councils, by courts asked 
to review the program’s constitutionality, and by members of the press and 
public seeking to hold the police to account. 
3. Scenario 3. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains a search warrant directed 
to an electronic communication service provider, seeking access to the contents 
of your email. The FBI also obtains a separate court order “commanding” the 
recipient not to notify any person of the existence of the order.73 As a result, the 
service provider turns over access to your emails but remains barred from 
informing you of the search. While the federal government publishes no data 
about how frequently it uses email search warrants or nondisclosure orders, 
communication service providers reportedly receive tens of thousands of search 
warrants each year.74 
The searches are not a complete secret, but nor are they transparent. 
Because the search and the nondisclosure orders are issued by the court, they 
enjoy some supervision by a magistrate.75 However, the recipient of the warrant 
is gagged from speaking about it, and you are unaware that your emails have 
been searched.76 Unless you are charged with a crime and move to suppress the 
evidence, you may never find out that the search occurred at all.77 The result is 
that while the search is known to the judicial branch, it remains a secret to you—
the individual affected—and to the public.78 
B. A Taxonomy of Law Enforcement Visibility 
While the primary function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect 
individual rights to privacy and security, its facilitation of public knowledge, 
 
 71. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing NYPD’s reluctance to release stop-and-frisk data). 
 72. See Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and 
Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 43 (1968). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b). 
 74. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 15, at 161. 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 2705. 
 76. See Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 895 (W.D. Wash. 2017). 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 2705. 
 78. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 15. 
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oversight, and participation in governance are important secondary effects.79 In 
this Section, I offer some potential ways of characterizing these considerations—
following Kitrosser—as a spectrum that considers how visible policing is to 
different actors and at different moments.80 Considering the flow of information 
about policing—transparency of what, to whom, and when—helps to explain the 
conditions that make democratic oversight of police more or less robust. 
1. Visibility of What? 
We might begin with the principle that the fact that a search has occurred 
is usually public. For example, an ordinary, physical search of a home—what 
Orin Kerr has called the “canonical fact pattern” of Fourth Amendment law—
takes place only pursuant to a warrant.81 By its nature, the warrant requires 
disclosure by the police to a magistrate: the police must describe the thing to be 
searched with particularity and establish probable cause for the search.82 
The fact of a search is ordinarily made plain to the target as well. 
Continuing with the canonical case of a home search, the occupant may well be 
home to observe the search taking place.83 For instance, the rules governing 
physical searches of the home include the requirement that the police “knock and 
announce” before entering.84 Today, the “knock and announce” rule is often 
described as a pragmatic one: by announcing their purpose before entering a 
home, police avoid threats to their own safety and to those of the home’s 
inhabitants.85 But “knock and announce” is rooted in the requirement of notice 
to the target of a search.86 
The principle of notice also protects a person’s right to know that they have 
been searched after the fact. In the seminal case of Wilkes v. Wood,87 a dissenting 
 
 79. See, e.g., Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, supra note 60, at 
2184. 
 80. Kitrosser, supra note 32. 
 81. Kerr, supra note 64; see also Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing 
Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912–18 (2010) (exploring the 
typical search of the physical home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 83. See, e.g., Schitt’s Creek: Our Cup Runneth Over (Feb. 11, 2015) (depicting the Rose family 
observing as the revenue agency seizes all their assets in the first scene of the series). 
 84. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995). 
 85. 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 6.2(a) (6th ed. 2020), Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2020) (“(1) [I]t reduces the potential for 
violence to both the police officers and the occupants of the house into which entry is sought; (2) it 
guards against the needless destruction of private property; and (3) it symbolizes the respect for 
individual privacy summarized in the adage that “a man’s house is his castle.” (quoting United States v. 
Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4 (9th Cir.1973))). 
 86. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (finding that the Fourth Amendment 
“seems to require notice in the form of an express announcement by the officers of their purpose for 
demanding admission”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 49 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part) 
(noting the requirement that officers announce their “purpose and authority” before entering a home is 
“of the essence of the substantive protections which safeguard individual liberty”). 
 87. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489; Lofft, 1. 
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printer filed an action for trespass after the government searched and seized all 
of their papers; a chief objection to the blanket search was that the searchers had 
failed to leave an inventory behind. 88  At a minimum, the logic ran, the 
government had to inform the target of what had been taken. 
The warrant requirement mitigates secrecy in a second way, by requiring 
the police to obtain judicial approval prior to a search, facilitating interbranch 
oversight.  The search warrant requirement thereby drastically lowers the secrecy 
with which law enforcement can act, even though magistrates ordinarily keep 
warrants sealed until after they are returned executed. The decision to seek a 
search warrant fosters transparency values in significant ways by bringing 
judicial oversight into a criminal investigation early on.89 And it is not simply 
that the warrant requirement compels law enforcement to obtain permission from 
a separate branch of government: it also imposes substantive and procedural 
obligations to identify both the reason for the search (by giving probable cause) 
and the result of the search (by returning the executed warrant with an inventory 
of what was seized). 
The fact that a search has occurred is fairly open to the public as well. Other 
witnesses might observe the search taking place. Even if not, the search warrant 
itself is typically a matter of public record.90 The fact that a search has occurred, 
then, is ordinarily revealed to a broad audience shortly after it happens. But 
public knowledge can be much richer: disclosure of search warrant records may 
establish the reason why an individual was searched and, more specifically, what 
was searched or taken. 
This is, of course, a highly stylized description of the ways that Fourth 
Amendment doctrine requires disclosure of certain kinds of information. There 
are plenty of exceptions to these principles. When officers search a home, they 
might reasonably determine that announcing themselves would aggravate, not 
mitigate, the risk of violence.91 If the search occurs when the occupant is not 
home, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that notice be given and 
an inventory be left.92 However, so-called “sneak-and-peek” warrants permit law 
enforcement to conduct a search but delay notice to the target for a period of 
thirty days or more.93 
 
 88. Id. at 498 (“The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons houses, break 
open escrutores, seize their papers, [and] upon a general warrant, where no inventory is made of the 
things thus taken away, and where no offenders names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a 
discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall.”). 
 89. See Pozen, supra note 34, at 308. 
 90. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 15, 173–74. 
 91. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995) (“[L]aw enforcement interests may also 
establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.”). 
 92. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(D). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b); see Jennifer Daskal, Notice and Standing in the Fourth Amendment: 
Searches of Personal Data, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 437, 442 (2017); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The 
Fatal Flaws of the “Sneak and Peek” Statute and How to Fix It, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 121 (2014). 
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Perhaps most significantly, Fourth Amendment doctrine has shifted in ways 
that limit the protections outlined in the preceding paragraphs. The numerous 
exceptions and carveouts to the so-called “warrant requirement” have led rueful 
commentators to liken it to “a piece of Swiss cheese.”94 Relying on the warrant 
requirement to ensure transparency in a world in which most searches are 
warrantless seems like fragile reassurance indeed. 95 Moreover, to the extent 
these presumptions are made meaningful by the existence of potential remedies, 
including the exclusionary rule or civil damages, the vanishing availability of 
exclusion and the expansion of qualified immunity call those remedies into 
question.96 
2. Visibility to Whom? 
As the above discussion begins to outline, the scenarios also distinguish 
between different figures to whom information might be disclosed—magistrates, 
the targets of a search, and the general public. Disclosing a search warrant 
application to a neutral magistrate before it is executed is an integral aspect of 
Fourth Amendment protections; disclosing it to the target of a search or to the 
general public before the search occurs is virtually unprecedented.97 The result 
is that, while policing may be more secretive than in past eras, changes in 
policing practice may also have made transparency litigation a more feasible 
accountability strategy. 
 
The circuit courts have disagreed about whether the lack of notice is a constitutional issue or simply a 
violation of the criminal rules. U.S. v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that notice 
was required to render search constitutional). Given the “heavy costs” of excluding evidence, it is 
perhaps not surprising that most courts of appeal, including the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, 
have concluded that lack of notice is not a constitutional issue at all, but rather simply a violation of the 
criminal rules. See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, and the Fourth 
Amendment “Rule Requiring Notice,” 41 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 579–80, 579 n. 397 (arguing the claim that 
notice is “not part of the Fourth Amendment at all” is “overstated,” and citing cases). 
 94. Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 
1610–11 (2012); see also William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 881, 882 (1991) (“[I]n practice warrants are the exception rather than the rule.”). 
 95. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1666 (“The little data that exists affirms the suspicion 
that warrants are the exception rather than the norm.”); BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 7 (2017) (“In a country of just over 300 million people, a rough analysis suggests 
state and local police conduct more than 8 million searches annually of pedestrians and automobiles 
alone.”); FRANK G. REMINGTON, LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY, DONALD M. MCINTYRE & DANIEL L. 
RROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 
ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 99–101, 101 n.8 (1967) (describing reliance on search warrants 
as rare). 
 96. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1650–51 (describing the relationship between Fourth 
Amendment standards and remedies). 
 97. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566–67 (1978), superseded by statute, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a), (b) (declining to impose an obligation of “prior notice and hearing” when police 
execute a search warrant at a newsroom). 
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First, the “neutral and detached magistrate” plays a critical role in checking 
and cabining police discretion.98 Ex ante disclosure to a magistrate may serve an 
instrumental goal: social science research suggests that when police are obligated 
to seek a warrant before conducting a search, they reach “better decisions,” either 
because they are more aware of the potential consequences of the search or 
because they express their reasoning more effectively.99 
But the ex ante judicial review anticipated by the warrant requirement is 
doubly important to visibility. By requiring judicial review before a search is 
executed, the warrant requirement involves a second branch of government in 
essential decision-making about a criminal investigation and thus limits secrecy 
within the government itself. 100  As David Pozen suggests, the warrant 
requirement can make secrecy shallower: one function of the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement is to “ensure[] that investigative secrecy will 
be moved from deeper to shallower before the moment when the search or 
seizure actually takes place” by involving the judiciary as a check on the 
executive branch. 101  This secrecy-minimizing rationale holds true even if 
magistrates are biased toward law enforcement and inclined to approve search 
warrants or give them minimal scrutiny. 102  Without an ex ante warrant 
requirement, courts would lack any knowledge of or involvement in criminal 
investigations until a defendant moves to suppress evidence.103 
Second, the target of a search is equally important in Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, although less favored. Most Fourth Amendment cases are presented by 
defendants seeking to suppress the fruits of a search.104 Knowing that you were 
the target of a search is vital to making out a Fourth Amendment claim, even if 
it is not always sufficient to create standing. 105  This is why parallel 
 
 98. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 
98, 100 (1959) (describing the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement as replacing “police 
control” with “judicial control”). 
 99. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1638–42. 
 100. Pozen, supra note 34, at 308; see also Stuntz, supra note 94, at 890 (writing that the warrant 
process is unique not because it provides a neutral decisionmaker—which ex post review does as well—
but because of the “timing of the magistrate’s decision” before the search takes place). 
 101. Pozen, supra note 34, at 308. Pozen, following Rubenfeld, further observes that the idea of 
deep secrecy “threatens not only the rule of law but also the sense of personal security that comes with 
living in a society governed by the rule of law.” Id. at 309. 
 102. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1639–40 (documenting concerns about “rubber 
stamp” magistrates). 
 103. Id.  at 1651–52 (describing how the ex post suppression model involves judges fairly late in 
the game). 
 104. See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2013) 
(“[T]he rights of all to be free from police intrusion are protected by an individual with contraband she 
seeks to suppress . . . . [B]ecause the harmed party is identified as a criminal at the outset, the balance 
starts skewed in favor of the government.”). 
 105. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding that defendants with neither  a “property 
nor a possessory interest” in the thing searched or seized lacked standing to invoke the exclusionary 
rule); see also Gray, supra note 13, at 88 (“[B]eing a target is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish 
eligibility to raise a Fourth Amendment claim.”). 
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construction—the practice of “laundering evidence in order to avoid court 
review of its actual provenance”—creates Fourth Amendment problems: it 
conceals the fact of a search from the target, minimizing the possibility that the 
target can raise a Fourth Amendment claim.106 
And third, although the figure of the general public is rarely explicitly 
discussed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is present in practice. Both the 
warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule operate to bring the public into 
criminal investigations in underappreciated ways. Although search warrants are 
issued ex parte, they are usually filed with the clerk after a search is executed.107 
Moreover, the dominance of the exclusionary rule as a Fourth Amendment 
remedy means the Fourth Amendment is enforced in pretrial hearings, which the 
public generally has a right to access.108 More generally, courts considering 
Fourth Amendment claims frequently seek to integrate the broader interests of 
society into their analyses of the defendant’s privacy rights and the government’s 
interests.109 For example, when the Supreme Court interprets the exclusionary 
rule as the “primary remedy” to vindicate Fourth Amendment rights, it 
emphasizes the need to apply the rule only where it “result[s] in appreciable 
deterrence.” 110  The Court’s deterrence rationale operates to “protect the 
innocent,”111 those who will never be charged with a crime—and will therefore 
never be able to suppress evidence in their own criminal prosecutions. 
3. Visibility at What Time? 
The foregoing discussion also gestures to a third important aspect of Fourth 
Amendment visibility: when do transparency-enhancing interventions take 
place? The obvious first step in many cases is at the warrant stage, which takes 
a step to minimize law enforcement secrecy while an investigation is still 
ongoing.112 But because search warrants are, today, the exception rather than the 
rule,113 many cases will fail to deliver the ex ante transparency search warrants 
otherwise promise. Nonetheless, transparency is rarely delayed for long. In cases 
 
 106. Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal 
Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 863–64 (2014) (describing how the 
government can avoid suppression of evidence by engaging in parallel construction). 
 107. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
 108. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 10 n.3 (1986). 
 109. See Baradaran, supra note 104, at 39–43 (arguing that courts generally ignore relevant data 
about societal factors in assessing whether to suppress evidence). 
 110. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 
433, 454 (1976)). 
 111. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960), (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
 112. Pozen, supra note 34, at 308; Stuntz, supra note 94. 
 113. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1611; see also Pozen, supra note 34, at 308 (arguing 
that the warrant exceptions “do not necessarily undermine” the transparency-enhancing potential of the 
warrant requirement because most of the exceptions are unlikely “to have been preceded by deep 
investigative secrecy”). 
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that involve warrantless searches, transparency frequently comes 
contemporaneously with the search itself.114 
Even when transparency is achieved only after a search takes place, as the 
office-search scenario suggests, it is early enough to allow defendants to move 
to suppress and thereby vindicate their Fourth Amendment rights. In other words, 
when a defendant raises a notice issue in the context of a suppression hearing, 
the law enforcement action being challenged is hardly a secret.115 If, as Sissela 
Bok suggests, a secret is something “intentional[ly] concealed,” a secret search 
litigated at a suppression hearing is not a secret at all: it has been laid bare to the 
defendant and the public.116 Challenges to truly secret searches, conversely, will 
almost never be presented in suppression hearings, because a defendant will not 
know that a secret search has occurred.117 
The limited duration of secrecy in these paradigmatic cases, in turn, also 
suggests that the value of requiring notice as a constitutional matter is minimal. 
Rather than having been permanently harmed by a lack of notice, defendants 
have the information they need to understand that they have been searched—and 
to challenge the constitutionality of those searches. Indeed, the procedural 
background of most of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which 
results from motions to suppress in criminal cases, confirms that defendants do 
become aware that their homes or property have been searched, even if it is after 
the fact. As a practical matter, the lack of notice may not matter to targets of 
searches who ultimately become criminal defendants, because defendants would 
ordinarily receive notice during the pendency of a criminal case and would 
therefore be able to move to suppress the evidence. 
C. The Challenge of Programmatic Policing 
Today, police often initially confront individuals through pedestrian or 
vehicle stops—routine, low-level encounters that are not a secret.118 Indeed, the 
 
 114. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (search of phone incident to lawful arrest). 
 115. See Pozen, supra note 34, at 271 (“[T]he depth of a secret decreases to the extent that 
members of the community, including their representatives in government, understand that information 
is being concealed from them, the basic contours of that information, and how to go about discovering 
what it is.”). 
 116. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 9 (Vintage 
Books 1989). 
 117. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“There may be . . . many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn 
up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and about which 
we never hear.”). 
 118. Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, 2016 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 299–300 (2016) (“Police encounters are where the public engages most often 
and most profoundly with the police. These encounters can take a variety of forms, from the benign to 
the fatal.”); G. Marcus Cole, Dean G. Marcus Cole: ‘I Am George Floyd. Except, I Can Breathe. And I 
Can Do Something.,’ U. NOTRE DAME L. SCH.: NEWS (June 8, 2020), https://law.nd.edu/news-
events/news/dean-g-marcus-cole-i-am-george-floyd-except-i-can-breathe-and-i-can-do-something/ 
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visibility of these encounters, and the ways in which they routinize police 
violence against Black people, in particular, fuel the ongoing uprisings against 
police violence and repression. In spite of this visibility, warrantless and 
“programmatic” policing techniques have also strained existing accountability 
mechanisms for searches and seizures.119 Nowhere is this clearer than in the 
context of the “Stop, Question, and Frisk” (SQF) strategy deployed in urban 
police departments. 
SQF emerged as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 
which held that law enforcement officers may briefly stop and frisk individuals 
for weapons based on a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and 
dangerous. 120  Even before Terry, the practice of stopping and frisking 
individuals was decades old. 121  But the Terry Court blessed the practice, 
recentering “reasonableness” as a key standard for law enforcement interactions 
with members of the public.122 In deemphasizing the more stringent “probable 
cause” standard, Terry permitted law enforcement to rely instead on a standard 
that is broad, flexible, and subjective. 123  Yet Terry also acknowledged the 
possibility that the tactic it permitted would have wider social effects, 
particularly for non-White people. Expressing some concern about the 
“wholesale harassment” of minority groups, the Court nonetheless concluded 
that the practice was constitutional.124 The “explicit racial component” of police 
discretion, which marked “racial incongruity” with one’s surroundings as 
suspicious, went unacknowledged.125 
 
[https://perma.cc/X77B-VEKW] (“The police officer was intent on nothing more than humiliating and 
emasculating me in front of my small children, hoping to provoke me to respond. At that moment, I 
remember thinking that the most important thing I could do for my sons was to survive the encounter.”); 
Peart, supra note 70. 
 119. By “programmatic” policing, I mean law enforcement tactics that do not proceed from the 
identification of an individual crime or suspect, but rather those aimed at “a broad body of the people” 
to deter or prevent crime. Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What's "Reasonable": The 
Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 281, 286–87 (2016); see also Renan, supra note 57, 
at 1042 (defining “programmatic” surveillance as being “designed en masse . . . through administrative 
policies”). 
 120. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
 121. See LaFave, supra note 72, at 42 (describing stop-and-frisk as a “time-honored police 
procedure” that had been neglected by the courts and scholars). 
 122. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 123. Id. at 30 (emphasizing that an officer may rely on experience and intuition in justifying their 
decision to stop and frisk an individual); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: 
Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1278 (1998) (describing how the 
“malleable” Terry standard expanded police discretion, with disproportionate effects on black men). 
 124. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15; see also Maclin, supra note 123, at 1285 (arguing that, although 
Terry “seems to recognize that race matters to the Fourth Amendment,” it “clearly occupied a 
subordinate position to the Court’s overriding concern about police safety and violent crime”). 
 125. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and 
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 460 n.17 (2000) (“Terry was African 
American, McFadden was white. McFadden's ‘professional judgment’ concerning Terry was based on 
[Terry’s presence] outside [of a typically] African-American [neighborhood].”); see also I. Bennett 
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While Terry seemingly expanded Fourth Amendment coverage, it reduced 
law enforcement accountability. Terry extended Fourth Amendment scrutiny to 
a broader range of interactions between individuals and police, rejecting the idea 
that only the most formal of searches and seizures could infringe individual 
rights as “simply fantastic.” 126  Nonetheless, this transformation strained the 
prevailing transparency norms. Terry’s conclusion that street encounters 
required no search warrant removed ex ante judicial review from the equation, 
and with it went a key opportunity for disclosure and oversight.127 As Wayne 
LaFave characterized stop-and-frisk in the immediate aftermath of Terry, it was 
not a “dark secret”—everybody knew about it—but the procedural and political 
realities of its use rendered it “low-visibility” in the sense that defining or curbing 
its use was not a political priority.128 
Terry explicitly focused on the ex ante understanding of the police officer 
in a discrete encounter with an individual.129 But SQF gained traction throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s as a key programmatic component of urban policing based 
on “Broken Windows,” “zero tolerance,” or “order maintenance policing.”130 
The core principle of Broken Windows is that “disorder and crime are usually 
inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence.”131 Broken Windows 
theory, therefore, encouraged police departments to concentrate their resources 
in areas of high disorder and granted departments broad discretion in determining 
exactly what “disorder” meant.132 Police departments quickly identified poor 
urban neighborhoods, which were frequently home to a predominantly Black and 
Latinx population, as the primary targets for “order maintenance” priorities: 
 
Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 68 (2009) (“[L]aw-abiding 
minorities in predominantly white communities face disproportionate stops by and encounters with the 
police, and law-abiding whites in minority communities face disproportionate stops by and encounters 
with the police. The officers in effect function as de facto border control, deciding who is scrutinized, 
stopped, questioned, or frisked.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 126. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1998) (describing the “‘nonsearch’ gambit”). 
 127. 392 U.S. at 20 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift 
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has 
not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”); see also Scott E. 
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. 
L. REV. 383, 401–02 (1988) (describing how the Terry decision altered the “traditional yardstick of 
probable cause” and replaced it with “reasonable suspicion” as a “compromise”). 
 128. LaFave, supra note 72, at 43. 
 129. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. 
L. REV. 327, 329 (2015) (describing reasonable suspicion as a “small data” doctrine).  
 130. Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of 
New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1504 & n.39 (2014); Fagan & Davies, supra 
note 125, at 462, 467. 
 131. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-
windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/VB5Z-FGTM]. 
 132. Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 875 (2015) 
(“Broken windows theory, in its construction of the disorderly, the lawless, and the outsider as legitimate 
subjects of policing, rendered already vulnerable individuals as even more vulnerable to policing.”). 
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“aggressively enforcing laws against public drunkenness, loitering, vandalism, 
littering, public urination, panhandling, prostitution, and other minor 
misdemeanors.”133 By singling out poor neighborhoods for Broken Windows 
interventions, police also embraced a place-based strategy that “target[ed] people 
of color, particularly African Americans, for stops and frisks.” 134  As the 
progenitors of Broken Windows put it in starkly racist language, a neighborhood 
might be transformed “to an inhospitable and frightening jungle” unless it 
addressed a range of threats: “rowdy children,” “unattached adults,” teens “in 
front of the corner store,” littering, “inebriate[s],” panhandling.135 Stopping and 
frisking individuals was an essential element of success for a “quality of life” 
strategy designed to increase arrests and tickets for misdemeanors and other low-
level offenses.136  
The “programmatic” policing techniques that SQF exemplifies bring 
unique and disproportionate impacts to poor and minority communities, not just 
individuals. 137  As Tracey Meares put it, SQF—and Broken Windows more 
generally—is “not simply a tool,” but rather a program that shifts police inquiries 
from individual crimes to “suspicious characteristics” of whole communities, 
seen through a skewed, racialized lens.138 In light of the programmatic nature of 
SQF, which is “carried out systematically, deliberately, and with great 
frequency,” Terry’s focus on the “individual, incident-level” approach seems to 
miss the point.139 Analyzing stops and frisks as discrete, individual incidents 
fails to appreciate how their “large scale and ‘group-based’ application” differs 
from the traditional, highly individualized model of policing. 140  These 
 
 133. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York 
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 301 (1998). Notably, while the original proponents of Broken Windows 
emphasized “alternatives to arrest and prosecution,” NYPD abandoned these alternatives, focusing 
instead on boosting arrests. Fagan & Davies, supra note 125, at 471. 
 134. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 957 (1999); see also Brett G. Stoudt, Michelle Fine & Madeline Fox, Growing Up 
Policed in the Age of Aggressive Policing Policies, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1331, 1347 (2012) 
(differentiating between, on the one hand, individual racially motivated stops and, on the other, racially 
disparate impact of the SQF program). 
 135. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 131. 
 136. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
611, 631–32 (2014); Fagan & Davies, supra note 125, at 477 (“[S]tops were disproportionately 
concentrated in the city’s poorest neighborhoods, neighborhoods with high concentrations of racial 
minorities.”). 
 137. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE 
L.J. 2054, 2139–40 (2017) (framing the “program” as “bigger than systematic Terry stops-and-frisks of 
young African American and Latino men,” but rather “endemic to policing itself”). 
 138. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-
Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 168–69 (2015). 
 139. Id. at 164. 
 140. Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a 
Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2402 (2017); see also Meares, supra note 138, 
at 168–69 (noting the programmatic nature of the policies); Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, 
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“ecological” harms, as Aziz Huq has put it, are a poor fit for Fourth Amendment 
doctrine’s “transactional frame.”141 
SQF became a key scholarly case study of programmatic policing not just 
because it vividly illustrated the impact of policing on entire communities but 
also because the traditional Fourth Amendment remedy of exclusion proved 
wildly inadequate to address its harms. Communities struggled to hold police 
accountable for this practice that was occurring in public, yet somehow out of 
the frame of oversight or accountability. As the Terry Court had predicted, the 
exclusionary rule would be “powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are 
willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other 
goal.” 142  
In the context of SQF, one result of Terry was to remove large swaths of 
police conduct from judicial oversight altogether, rendering significant aspects 
of policing invisible to the courts.143 According to the Attorney General’s report, 
only 6 percent of all SQF stops in New York City resulted in an arrest, and 6 
percent resulted in a summons.144 This left relatively few individuals who could 
have moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an unlawful stop and frisk. The 
result, as this Article demonstrates in the Section that follows, was that activists, 
individuals, and organizations partly turned away from the traditional avenues of 
vindicating Fourth Amendment rights and instead strategically deployed 
transparency litigation designed to bring SQF into the spotlight and boost its 
political salience. 
III. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE’S SHADOW DOCKET 
Along nearly every axis, the nature of policing has changed dramatically, 
calling into question the archetypal contours of Fourth Amendment doctrine. The 
realities of modern policing programs and technologies show that the warrant 
requirement and exclusionary rule are ineffective safeguards against unchecked, 
opaque policing. New technologies of surveillance have strengthened police 
departments’ ability to engage in the “low-visibility” strategies first 
implemented with stop and frisk and indeed have deepened the shadows around 
these practices. In short, against the consensus view that policing ought to be 
 
Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 834–35 (2011) (overviewing 
suspicionless search programs). 
 141. Huq, supra note 140, at 2402, 2450; Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in 
Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 (2002). 
 142. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968). 
 143. See 392 U.S. at 13 (“[I]n our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the 
judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional 
guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents.”) 
 144. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the 
NYPD’s “hit rate”). 
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more democratic, more accountable, and more transparent, significant evidence 
suggests that new technology and shifts in Fourth Amendment doctrine have 
undermined these values.145 
This Section explores one response: the development of what I call criminal 
procedure’s “shadow docket.” Criminal procedure is heavily 
constitutionalized.146 Increasingly, however, oversight institutions, individuals, 
and civil society organizations have turned to a “shadow docket” of transparency 
litigation that does not resolve the constitutional merits of any law enforcement 
practice but rather functions as a mechanism to access the data and information 
critical to understanding policing practices. Many advocates are deploying a dual 
strategy of transparency litigation in tandem with substantive Fourth 
Amendment claims to expose programmatic surveillance and policing 
technology. 
If I am correct that the turn toward transparency litigation has been 
prompted by deficiencies in existing constitutional, statutory, and regulatory 
frameworks for police accountability, then the “shadow docket” has flourished 
because it is one of the few effective strategies at extracting critical information 
from law enforcement. But the turn toward transparency litigation to promote 
police accountability has also led courts to develop a body of caselaw outside of 
the traditional framework of constitutional law that, nonetheless, is salient to 
criminal procedure. These efforts, I show, are part of a multiprong strategy to 
reform law enforcement and subject it to democratic control. 
A. Transparency Advocacy Challenging Programmatic Policing 
1. Stop, Question, Frisk 
Early in the morning on February 4, 1999, four New York Police 
Department (NYPD) officers killed Amadou Diallo, a twenty-two-year-old 
unarmed West African immigrant, in a fusillade of forty-one shots outside his 
home in the Bronx as he fumbled with his wallet.147 The officers were stopping 
Diallo because he ostensibly resembled a rape suspect, but the stop immediately 
went wrong when they interpreted his wallet as a weapon.148 The officers were 
members of the Street Crimes Unit (SCU), an “elite”—and overwhelmingly 
 
 145. See supra Part I.B (articulating the consensus view). 
 146. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 1, 7–8 (1996) (noting some of the perverse incentives created by the constitutionalization of 
criminal procedure). 
 147. Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1, B5, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/nyregion/officers-in-bronx-fire-
41-shots-and-an-unarmed-man-is-killed.html [https://perma.cc/S4JD-5AXQ]. 
 148. Robert D. McFadden & Kit R. Roane, U.S. Examining Killing of Man in Police Volley, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at A1, B6, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/06/nyregion/us-examining-killing-
of-man-in-police-volley.html [https://perma.cc/N8BC-X8QL]. 
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White—squad of almost four hundred officers based at Randall’s Island that 
focused on searching for guns as well as other dangers to New York residents.149 
Public outcry was enormous and immediate.150 Local, federal, and state 
officials made clear their intent to investigate the broader circumstances 
surrounding Diallo’s murder.151 Quickly, investigators turned toward the SCU’s 
use of “stop and frisk” tactics and other “lower-level” encounters between 
civilians and police.152 Barely a month after Diallo’s murder, a group of Black 
and Latinx plaintiffs filed Daniels v. City of New York, the first case to challenge 
NYPD’s stop and frisk program.153 
SQF underscores how reform efforts have deployed transparency law and 
litigation in tandem with substantive constitutional and civil rights claims to 
subject police practices to public scrutiny and democratic oversight. In addition 
to the constitutional merits of SQF, transparency about the NYPD’s practices 
became a key focal point for efforts to hold the department accountable.  Both 
understanding and challenging SQF required extensive access to data, which 
investigators and legislators quickly demanded NYPD provide. NYPD 
“scrambl[ed]” to compile data regarding the SQF program, hiring temporary 
workers to comb through all its stop-and-frisk reports—generated on a form 
called the UF-250—in order to produce them to investigators and oversight 
bodies.154 Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, who conducted his own investigation 
of the program, threatened to subpoena NYPD for “thousands of documents” 
when the city refused to hand data over voluntarily. 155  In the end, NYPD 
provided UF-250 data from 1994 through April 1999 to federal investigators.156  
The centrality of data to effective oversight also prompted the legislature to act. 
 
 149. David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 15, 1999, at A1, B5, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/15/nyregion/success-of-elite-police-unit-
exacts-a-toll-on-the-streets.html [https://perma.cc/88AB-GSD6]. 
 150. Katherine E. Finkelstein, Protests in Police Killing of Diallo Grow Larger, and More 
Diverse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at B12, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/25/nyregion/protests-
in-police-killing-of-diallo-grow-larger-and-more-diverse.html [https://perma.cc/WFA6-F582]. 
 151. Michael Cooper, Street Searches by City’s Police Lead to Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 
1999, at A1, B6, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/18/nyregion/street-searches-by-city-s-police-lead-
to-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/3H6C-2LW6]. 
 152. ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK” 
PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 8 (1999); Benjamin Weiser, Frisking Policy of the Police Faces Scrutiny, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1999, at B1, B5, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/19/nyregion/frisking-policy-of-
the-police-faces-scrutiny.html [https://perma.cc/X39M-76TM]. 
 153. Daniels v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 154. Larry Celona, NYPD To Bare ‘Stop & Frisk’ Data, N.Y. POST (Apr. 12, 1999) 
https://nypost.com/1999/04/12/nypd-to-bare-stop-exclusive/ [https://perma.cc/H2KJ-GBVE]. 
 155. Kit R. Roane, Spitzer Threatens Subpoena for Police Data on Frisking, N.Y. TIMES, May 
16, 1999 (§ 1), at 39, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/16/nyregion/spitzer-threatens-subpoena-for-
police-data-on-frisking.html [https://perma.cc/XRB3-Y7P9]. The city ultimately backed down. Kit R. 
Roane, Giuliani Agrees to Give the State Police Documents on Frisking, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1999 
(§ B), at 5, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/26/nyregion/giuliani-agrees-to-give-the-state-police-
documents-on-frisking.html [https://perma.cc/R2P5-KDRH]. 
 156. Daniels v. City of New York, 200 F.R.D. 205, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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In 2001, the New York City Council enacted the Police Reporting Law, which 
required NYPD to produce data regarding the department’s SQF program on a 
quarterly basis.157 
Access to SQF data also proved integral to the stop and frisk litigation. In 
January 2000, the Daniels parties agreed that the NYPD would produce the UF-
250 database to plaintiffs subject to certain nondisclosure provisions.158 When 
Daniels settled in 2003, the settlement agreement included the critical 
component that NYPD continue to use the UF-250 database to track all SQF 
activity—and continue to disclose the data, in redacted form, to the plaintiffs’ 
counsel on a quarterly basis.159 
Even after Daniels settled, SQF data continued to prove essential to 
mobilizing civil society organizations and the public for additional reforms to 
the SQF program.160 In February 2007, NYPD released statistics establishing 
that it had stopped, questioned, or frisked over half a million individuals.161 In 
response to widespread negative blowback, NYPD then commissioned the 
RAND Corporation to write a report on racial bias in the SQF program. Relying 
on data from the NYPD’s computerized UF-250 database, RAND concluded that 
the raw statistics “distort the magnitude and, at times, the existence of racially 
biased policing” and that “a large-scale restructuring” of the SQF program was 
“unwarranted.”162 
But when the city council requested the UF-250 database to perform its 
own analysis, NYPD refused to grant it.163 In response, the New York Civil 
Liberties Union filed a Freedom of Information Law request (and then an Article 
78 proceeding) seeking access to the UF-250 database.164 The City vigorously 
 
 157. N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 2001/055 (codified as amended at ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, ch. 1, § 14-
150).  
 158. Protective Order ¶ 2, Daniels v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(No. 99-CV-01695). The agreement went haywire when the plaintiffs certified a class, leading NYPD 
to seek a stay that would allow the agency to avoid producing the UF-250 database to the plaintiffs until 
it had exhausted its appeal of the class certification to the Second Circuit. 138 F. Supp. 2d at 564. 
 159. Stipulation of Settlement at 8, Daniels, 138 F. Supp 2d 562 (No. 99-CV-01695). In addition, 
NYPD agreed to engage in some public-facing outreach, including by engaging in several Joint 
Community Forums, presenting workshops at local high schools, and revising its “Understanding Your 
Rights” pamphlets.⁠ Id. at 9–10. 
 160. See ARIEL E. BELEN, NEW YORK CITY JOINT REMEDIAL PROCESS ON NYPD’S STOP, 
QUESTION, AND FRISK, AND TRESPASS ENFORCEMENT POLICIES: FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 43–45 (2018) (“[T]he UF-250 and the later-created UF-250 database have played 
a crucial role in the ability of actors outside of the NYPD, including the public, to assess the effectiveness 
and constitutionality of the NYPD’s SQF practices over time.”). 
 161. NYPD, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (NYPD) STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK 
DATABASE, 2006 (2008). 
 162. GREG RIDGEWAY, RAND CORP., ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK 
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES, at xiv (2007). 
 163. Rocco Parascandola, New York Police Will Release Stop-Frisk Reports, MCCLATCHY – 
TRIB. BUS. NEWS (Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with author). 
 164. Verified Petition, N.Y.C.L. Union v. NYPD, No. 115154/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2007). 
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argued that disclosure of the UF-250 database would jeopardize security.165 
Disclosing the database, the City argued, would enable a bad actor to reconstruct 
the patterns of police officers’ movements and their “enforcement strategies” 
throughout the city.166 The court rejected the argument and ordered NYPD to 
release the database, noting that NYPD had already “provided copies of the 
database to at least two other outside organizations,” including RAND.167 
The dual strategy of seeking constitutional accountability at the same time 
as compelling data access embraced by challengers of stop-and-frisk in New 
York City has also gained traction elsewhere. In Philadelphia, for instance, the 
police department is subject to ongoing court-appointed monitoring due to its 
stop-and-frisk policy.168 In 2016, the city’s Defender Association filed a lawsuit 
seeking access to more granular data about the Police Department’s stop-and-
frisk patterns.169  
2. Other “Broken Windows” programs 
Similar patterns also arise in other programmatic policing contexts. In early 
2012, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) filed an Article 78 petition 
seeking information about an NYPD program called “Operation Clean Halls” or 
the “Trespass Affidavit Program.” 170  The program, which was decades old, 
enlisted private landlords to permit police officers to enter their buildings and 
arrest trespassers and loiterers.171 Two months later, NYCLU attorneys appeared 
in federal court in Ligon v. City of New York alongside attorneys from the Bronx 
Defenders and LatinoJustice PRLDEF, representing a class of plaintiffs 
challenging the program on the grounds that it violated the Fair Housing Act, the 
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 166. Id. at 6. 
 167. N.Y.C.L. Union v. NYPD, No. 115154/07, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2008) (“The 
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01034). 
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(N.Y. Sup. Jan. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 173498. 
 171. Julie Turkewitz, In New York, a 20-Year-Old Policy Suddenly Prompts a Lawsuit, THE 
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First Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment.172 Ligon was ultimately resolved 
in the same remedies opinion as Floyd v. City of New York.173 
Transparency litigation has continued to play a critical role in exposing 
Broken Windows practices to public scrutiny up to the present moment.174 In 
July 2017, New York City Councilmember Rory Lancman introduced a bill to 
require NYPD to publish data on the number of arrests and summonses issued 
for subway fare evasion on a quarterly basis.175 The existing data, gleaned by 
public defender organizations who represented individuals accused of 
farebeating, showed widespread racial disparities.176 Lancman’s bill, enacted in 
2018, required NYPD to begin publishing quarterly reports that included the total 
number of fare evasion arrests, disaggregated by district, transit station, and 
demographic information of the arrestee.177 
But NYPD did not comply with the law’s disclosure mandates, failing to 
publish relevant data regarding arrests at the vast majority of the city’s 472 
subway stations. 178  In May 2018, Council Member Lancman, alongside the 
Community Service Society (CSS)—a nonprofit organization that advocates for 
poor New Yorkers—filed a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request seeking 
the data that NYPD had failed to publish.179 NYPD denied the request, arguing 
that releasing the statistical information Lancman and CSS sought—and which 
the Department was compelled by statute to disclose—would jeopardize public 
safety by permitting statistical analysis that “could be used to deduce the regular 
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deployment of NYPD resources at various stations through New York City.”180 
When Lancman filed an Article 78 proceeding to compel NYPD to disclose the 
information, the court rejected the City’s argument as “speculative at best, and 
improbable at worst,” and ordered the data disclosed.181 
B. Data-Driven Policing 
The SQF litigation exemplifies how the turn from “transactional” 
investigations based on individual suspicion to “programmatic” policing 
methods has strained public oversight mechanisms and required new ways of 
addressing transparency for Fourth Amendment activity. Law enforcement’s 
shift toward data-driven policing strategies has further diminished its 
visibility.182 Unlike the classic Broken Windows modalities of policing—such 
as stops, frisks, and arrests—data-driven policing practices often do not directly 
implicate Fourth Amendment protections. 183  While these techniques might 
sometimes be used to investigate individual crimes, they are at least as often used 
as “dragnets” intended to sweep up information about large segments of the 
public.184 And while challenges to the constitutionality of physical dragnets such 
as roadblocks, administrative searches, and drug testing have come to the Court, 
there is little guidance on how the Fourth Amendment might apply to data-driven 
policing. 185  Although the Supreme Court in the recent cases of Jones and 
Carpenter ruled that pervasive, long-term location tracking is the subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection, it remains unclear how those decisions fit with 
the longstanding rule that searches of public information are not really 
“searches” at all.186 
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In light of these constitutional dynamics, transparency litigation is a critical 
avenue to understanding the implications of contemporary policing strategies. 
As documented in this Section, these efforts to expose modern policing 
technologies to scrutiny are part of a broader litigation and political strategy to 
shift the political discourse as well as the substantive rules that govern law 
enforcement investigations.187 
1. Gang Databases 
Gang policing—which one National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) attorney called “the new stop and frisk”—
demonstrates how new policing techniques function opaquely and how a 
“shadow docket” of transparency litigation has emerged in response.188 Gang 
databases collect information about alleged members of criminal gangs for use 
by law enforcement and other agencies. Although gang database practices vary 
somewhat among jurisdictions, they tend to have some common features. First, 
individuals are usually neither notified that they have been included in a gang 
database nor given an opportunity to challenge a designation as a gang member 
or affiliate.189 Second, the criteria for inclusion tend to be unclear, and police 
departments have broad discretion to designate individuals as gang members.190 
Third, many agencies tend to permit widespread sharing of information from the 
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databases with other law enforcement institutions.191 Finally, gang databases are 
often inaccurate and raise concern about potential impacts on free expression and 
association.192 
As Professor Babe Howell has pointed out, gang policing-by-database 
“avoids both public and judicial scrutiny” by taking place in secret.193 Gang 
databases also tend to operate without rigorous public oversight.194 As a result, 
individuals and organizations have turned toward transparency law to lay the 
basis for a legal challenge to gang policing tactics. 
In New York City, for instance, organizations have employed a strategic 
shift toward use of the State’s FOIL to obtain critical information about gang 
policing.195 Although NYPD has repeatedly testified before the New York City 
Council in general terms about the Criminal Group Database, it has never made 
public the criteria that it uses in determining whether to include an individual.196 
Nor has the city council compelled NYPD to do so. Even NYPD’s definition of 
a “criminal group” is unclear. 197  Accordingly, in 2018, the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed an Article 78 
proceeding seeking to compel disclosure of records reflecting the criteria for 
inclusion in the gang database, demographic information for individuals 
included in the database, and documents about the relationship between the gang 
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Exec. Dir. of Legis. Affs., NYPD) (describing the criteria for inclusion in the database). 
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database and NYPD’s “Domain Awareness System.”198 Transparency litigation 
has also been a critical avenue for academic researchers and advocates to gain 
access to information about the demographics of those whom the city’s Criminal 
Group Database includes.199 
Elsewhere in the United States, open records efforts have also 
supplemented substantive lawsuits seeking reform of gang policing strategies. In 
2018, ProPublica-Illinois obtained access to the de-identified data from 
Chicago’s gang database after filing a state open records request.200 The Chicago 
Police Department (CPD) was using a data “warehouse” called the Citizen and 
Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting System (CLEAR) to track gang 
affiliations based on certain types of inputs, including social media posts, tattoos, 
and arrest records.201 CLEAR, which was developed through a partnership with 
Oracle, is part of a broader effort by Chicago police to predict future episodes of 
violence.202 By 2018, when ProPublica published the dataset, CLEAR housed 
information about over 128,000 individuals.203 As ProPublica noted, however, 
the accuracy of some of the entries was questionable: the database included 
entries for over a hundred people who were over the age of seventy and several 
who were over one hundred.204 Chicago’s Inspector General also audited the 
gang database and likewise concluded that it was riddled with errors.205 
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A few months after ProPublica published its report, the MacArthur Justice 
Center filed a class action complaint against the City of Chicago and the CPD on 
behalf of a number of individual and organizational plaintiffs.206 The lawsuit 
challenged the database on procedural due process, equal protection, and Fourth 
Amendment grounds. MacArthur sought an injunction that would require 
Chicago to limit the criteria for entry into the database, provide notice and an 
opportunity to contest a designation as a gang member, and forbid sharing the 
gang data with third parties.207 
Advocates are also resorting to grassroots open records strategies as a 
remedy for procedural due process concerns. Because NYPD does not notify 
individuals of their inclusion in the database, many of the tens of thousands of 
New Yorkers designated as gang affiliates may not even be aware.208 In 2018, 
the Legal Aid Society, along with dozens of other defense and racial justice 
organizations, launched “FOIL Yourself,” a campaign they described as 
intended “to help impacted people and communities obtain basic transparency 
and accountability in how [the] Department classifies New Yorkers as gang 
affiliates.”209 NYPD has reportedly denied each of the FOIL requests it has 
received for information that would disclose whether the requesters are in fact in 
the Criminal Group Database, citing security concerns.210 In November 2018, 
Keith Shenery, one of the individuals who had FOILed his own records, filed an 
Article 78 petition to challenge the NYPD’s decision to withhold them.211 In 
Chicago, a coalition of racial justice movement groups—Mijente, Organized 
Communities Against Deportation, and Black Youth Project 100—have also 
embraced the grassroots FOIA strategy to help individuals learn whether they 
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are in CLEAR.212 In the face of secretive gang policing practices, the shadow 
docket is thus playing a critical role in advancing individual rights as well as 
public knowledge and political change. 
2. Private Sector Partnerships 
The informational dynamics of modern policing technologies grow even 
more complex when private sector vendors are involved.213 As Catherine Crump 
has documented, law enforcement agencies often begin new surveillance 
programs and acquire surveillance tools without disclosing those activities to city 
council and other oversight agencies, let alone the public. 214  As a result, 
surveillance and other new policing programs are often initiated without any kind 
of public input.215 A web of nondisclosure agreements, some of which purport 
to override state open records obligations, often surrounds policing technology 
supplied by private-sector vendors.216 
At both the state and federal level, civil society groups, scholars, and 
journalists are using open records litigation to shed light on predictive policing 
technology, which exemplifies these concerns. 217  In December 2016, the 
Brennan Center for Justice filed an Article 78 proceeding in New York to compel 
NYPD to release records relating to predictive policing technology. 218  The 
Brennan Center noted that NYPD had paid to obtain a software technology called 
Gotham from Palantir, a secretive tech company known to provide surveillance 
tools to law enforcement.219 Among other items, the Brennan Center sought 
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contracting documents, purchase records, marketing materials from vendors, and 
records pertaining to audits of Gotham and other predictive policing tools.220 
Shortly after the Brennan Center filed its petition, the New York City 
Council introduced the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) 
Act, which would require NYPD to conduct an impact assessment of each 
“surveillance technology” that it uses.221 The POST Act is one of a number of 
legislative proposals that impose accountability and transparency requirements 
on police technology.222 Unlike many of its stronger counterparts, the POST Act 
does not require ex ante legislative approval of surveillance technology but rather 
provides oversight through requiring post hoc reports. 223 NYPD nonetheless 
objected to even this weak form of oversight, and the bill was stalled for nearly 
three years.224 Finally, in June 2020, the city council passed the POST Act along 
with a suite of other reforms.225 
Against this background, the Brennan Center’s effort to bring NYPD’s 
predictive policing systems into the open took on more significance. NYPD 
claimed that it could not provide records about the audits or test results from 
Palantir because the agency had entered into a nondisclosure agreement with 
Palantir and the other potential vendors. 226  Releasing information about the 
accuracy of NYPD’s predictive policing tools, it claimed, would jeopardize 
vendors’ trade secrets.227 While the court ultimately rejected the trade secrets 
claim as unfounded, the developers of proprietary tools such as breathalyzers and 
forensic analysis software have advanced similar trade secrets claims in other 
law enforcement contexts that impede transparency and accountability 
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interests. 228  In response, legislators have begun to consider restricting the 
assertion of the trade secrets privilege.229 
Similar efforts are apace to expose police use of facial recognition and 
surveillance cameras. Law enforcement has turned to private sector vendors, 
including Amazon and Microsoft, to provide facial recognition software even in 
the absence of affirmative legislation, meaningful civil liberties safeguards, or 
transparency obligations.230 Amazon’s home surveillance subsidiary, Ring, has 
also entered into agreements with law enforcement to encourage consumers to 
adopt Ring products. Ring is reportedly also working toward implementing facial 
recognition within the hardware.231 The turn toward facial recognition has raised 
particular concerns in light of the mixed evidence about the accuracy of its results 
and the high potential cost of error.232 Facial recognition software misidentifies 
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Black and Asian faces as potential matches more frequently than it does White 
faces and performs particularly poorly for dark-skinned women.233 At least two 
people have been arrested after facial recognition software wrongly flagged them 
as matches for criminal suspects.234 
Leading researchers and advocacy groups concerned with the spread of 
facial recognition technology, including the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), Georgetown’s Center on Privacy and Technology, and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, rely on open records requests in support of their research 
and advocacy. 235  In 2019, the ACLU filed a FOIA lawsuit seeking records 
related to the use of biometric surveillance and facial recognition by the FBI and 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 236  STOP Spying recently filed a 
lawsuit against the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) after the 
agency would not disclose whether surveillance cameras installed in the Times 
Square transit hub had facial recognition capabilities. 237  As policing 
technologies hoover up vast amounts of private individual data without 
oversight, notice, due process, or community input, transparency litigation is 
providing a partial avenue to expose these practices—and to push back. 
C. Electronic Surveillance 
Digital searches are even less transparent than either the traditional, 
discrete, “transactional” searches or the more “programmatic” practices that 
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emanated from Broken Windows. In the digital context, secret searches are not 
uncommon. Some searches are secret by virtue of the application of complex 
statutory schemes that keep them out of view; other searches remain secret for 
mundane administrative reasons. And, when asked to review sealing orders, gag 
orders, and other secrecy mechanisms related to digital searches, courts have 
often avoided resolving hard questions about whether secrecy is justified, despite 
the implications for search and seizure law itself. 
Digital search warrants and surveillance orders are often accompanied by a 
complex web of nondisclosure requirements, prosecutorial practices, and local 
court rules that prevent public docketing. 238  For example, numerous federal 
district courts have established local rules establishing a presumption of secrecy 
for digital search warrants and surveillance applications and orders.239 
Law enforcement may also keep searches secret in less formal ways. For 
instance, the government may engage in “parallel construction” to keep searches 
from coming to light through “laundering the information in question by 
concocting independent sources through field interviews, confidential 
informants, physical searches and seizures, etc.”240 As Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) has put it, parallel construction allows the government to “creat[e] 
fictions to keep potentially questionable investigative activities out of sight.”241 
In 2013, Reuters reported that the DEA was collecting and distributing telephone 
records for investigative purposes without disclosing the practice. Instead, DEA 
agents used “normal investigative techniques to recreate the information.”242 
HRW reports that the practice of parallel construction has a long pedigree: as 
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under seal, but not requiring a motion to seal). 
 240. Fairfield & Luna, supra note 192, at 1042. 
 241. HUM. RTS. WATCH, DARK SIDE: SECRET ORIGINS OF EVIDENCE IN US CRIMINAL CASES 2 
(2018), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0118.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VXJ-28GA]. 
 242. John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. Directs Agents to Cover Up Program 
Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dea-sod-
idUSBRE97409R20130805 [https://perma.cc/HJV8-E4QP]. Certain types of foreign intelligence 
surveillance are often kept secret as well. For example, Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act 
authorizes the government to target and collect the communications of non-United States persons 
outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. Many of these programs 
only came to light because NSA contractor Edward Snowden exposed them. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, 
Julie Tate & Ashkan Soltani, In NSA-Intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber the 
Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-
are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html [https://perma.cc/CM2P-
7KDP]. The secrecy issues related to national security surveillance can, and have, filled volumes. See, 
e.g., supra notes 40–41; Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 1313 (2016). 
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early as 1976, intelligence agencies considered how they could avoid disclosing 
classified intelligence to criminal defendants in court cases.243 
The central role of communications service providers in disclosing user 
data upon government request also impedes transparency by allowing law 
enforcement to avoid notifying users about searches of communications records. 
Most warrants and court orders to compel the disclosure of user information are 
directed at communications intermediaries.244 Under Section 2703 of the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA), law enforcement can seek a search warrant directed 
at the communications service provider to obtain the contents of a user’s online 
communications, such as their emails.245 Unlike the ordinary search warrant 
framework, however, the SCA does not require law enforcement to notify the 
target of an SCA search warrant.246 In other words, it is up to the service provider 
to decide whether to notify its customers that law enforcement has searched their 
emails.247 Indeed, numerous lower courts have agreed that providing notice to 
the service provider satisfies the government’s notice obligations under the 
SCA.248 
But the service providers who receive search warrants for their customers’ 
information often are forbidden to notify the targets of searches. Section 2705(b) 
of the SCA permits the government to seek a court order commanding the service 
provider not to notify the target of a search.249 
The result puts communications intermediaries in a distinctively powerful 
position to either facilitate or impede public knowledge about surveillance.250 
Tech companies have sometimes mounted successful public campaigns to 
address surveillance secrecy. In 2016, Microsoft filed a complaint in federal 
district court alleging that over a period of eighteen months, it had received 
almost 2,600 secrecy orders preventing it from notifying its customers that the 
 
 243. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 241, at 15. 
 244. See generally Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99 
(2018) (discussing the role of companies like Apple, Google, and Facebook in government surveillance). 
 245. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
 246. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A). 
 247. See, e.g., EXEC. OFF. FOR U. S. ATT’YS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND 
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 135 (2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JC9Z-KTF5]. 
 248. See, e.g., In re Application of the U. S. for a Search Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail, 665 
F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221–22 (D. Or. 2009) (concluding that, “when the property to be seized is in the 
possession of a third party,” the Stored Communications Act and Fourth Amendment require only notice 
to the third party); Application for Warrant for Email Acct. [redacted]@gmail.com, No. 10-291-M-01 
(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2010) (order granting warrant), https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/mag10-
291.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HMM-W3DP]. 
 249. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (setting out requirements for separate nondisclosure order). 
 250. See Rozenshtein, supra note 244; Jonathan Manes, Online Service Providers and 
Surveillance Law Transparency, 125 YALE L.J.F. 343, 345 (2016) (noting that, given the informational 
dynamics of compelled disclosure, tech companies are uniquely able to articulate “how the government 
has construed its surveillance authority”). 
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government had searched their records. 251  Microsoft argued that the secret 
searches of its users’ emails violated their Fourth Amendment rights by evading 
the constitutionally required notice to the target of a search.252 But the court ruled 
that Microsoft lacked standing to advance a Fourth Amendment claim on behalf 
of its users.253 As a result, the court could not consider the company’s argument 
that the secrecy of digital searches made them unreasonable.254 At the same time, 
Microsoft successfully argued that expansive gag orders infringe their First 
Amendment rights.255 Although Microsoft heralded this victory against secrecy 
requirements, critics have cast doubt on firms’ motivations for challenging 
secrecy orders and surveillance practices, noting that in the majority of cases, 
platforms appear to acquiesce to law enforcement demands.256  
The broader ecology of secrecy has also prompted others to deploy 
transparency law to unveil digital surveillance practices. A Seattle-based news 
organization, The Stranger, filed a petition to unseal a secret digital surveillance 
docket, arguing that the systemic opacity violated the public’s First Amendment 
right of access to government proceedings.257 The Stranger explicitly linked the 
interest in transparency to the fact that the government can often use digital 
surveillance without probable cause, contending that the lower evidentiary 
threshold made the public interest more pronounced. 258  While the Federal 
Prosecutor’s Office opposed the petition, it acknowledged the court’s power to 
adopt changes to its docketing practices and expressed support for a coordinated 
process to assess the impact of new unsealing procedures.259 After mediation, 
the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the Court Clerk developed new procedures 
that would make the docket far more transparent, and The Stranger agreed to 
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2018), ECF No. 14. 
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dismiss the case.260 Journalists and advocates have employed similar approaches 
in California, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere to seek access to information 
about digital surveillance practices.261 
IV. 
POLICING, SECRECY, AND DEMOCRACY 
This Section explains both the positive aspects and potential drawbacks of 
relying on transparency’s “shadow docket” to advance law enforcement 
accountability. Even if not explicitly, the literature on procedural justice, 
democratic policing, and community policing rests on a set of assumptions about 
the value of transparency in promoting public trust, accountability, and 
compliance with the law. Whether transparency litigation is an effective way of 
achieving those interests remains to be seen, however. 
A. Broadening the Range of Potential Litigants 
Many of the cases outlined in the previous Section produced important 
records and documents about policing that have generated substantive change, 
stimulated oversight efforts, prompted public discussion, and motivated 
additional advocacy. When courts ordered the NYPD to disclose records about 
SQF and the Trespass Affidavit Program in New York City, the information 
therein formed the basis of successful class action lawsuits.262 When Microsoft 
challenged the federal government’s widespread use of gag orders to obscure 
digital searches, it extracted a settlement that restricted the use of secrecy 
orders.263  
The law of access to government records and proceedings can further 
incentivize civil society organizations, movement groups, and individuals to 
bring lawsuits to expose practices and policies that might otherwise go 
unchallenged.264 FOIA, for example, permits “any person” to file a request for 
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government records—and a lawsuit compelling their disclosure. 265  This 
statutory structure was intended to promote newsgathering, making it easier for 
journalists and news organizations to gain access to information critical for 
informed public participation.266 FOIA’s fee-shifting provision, which awards 
attorneys’ fees to FOIA requesters who prevail in court, was likewise intended 
to ensure that the “average citizen can take advantage of the law to the same 
extent as the giant corporations with large legal staffs.”267 Several states, though 
by no means all, have adopted similar fee-shifting provisions in state public 
records acts.268 Similarly, the courts have repeatedly held that any member of 
the press or public may advance the First Amendment right of access to 
government proceedings because secrecy impinges upon the First Amendment’s 
“structural role . . . in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government.”269 
At least in theory, the fact that anyone can seek access to government 
records through FOIA or the First Amendment improves the likelihood that the 
public will learn about secret police programs and surveillance techniques. This 
is particularly important because secretive and surreptitious policing techniques 
evade application of the exclusionary rule and thus leave many substantial 
questions about the constitutionality of surveillance unanswered.270 Because the 
rules on notice are unclear at best, it seems possible that many individuals are 
arrested on the basis of evidence that is never disclosed to them. 271  As 
Georgetown’s Clare Garvie noted in the context of facial recognition, law 
enforcement typically considers identifications produced by a facial recognition 
system to be “investigative leads,” and they rarely disclose information about the 
role of facial recognition to defendants.272 
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But despite their promise, efforts to shed light on records concerning 
surveillance and policing can also be frustratingly slow. It has been over two 
years since ProPublica first gained access to de-identified data from Chicago’s 
gang database. 273  Since that time, the city’s Inspector General has issued a 
damning report about the database, and Lori Lightfoot included a promise to 
replace the database with a better and more limited alternative in her successful 
mayoral campaign.274 
Even though any individual is theoretically able to bring an open records 
lawsuit, a relatively small number of civil society organizations with in-house 
interests and expertise in transparency litigation have remained primarily 
responsible for advancing the shadow docket. Unsurprisingly, some of these 
organizations, such as the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, share 
interests in transparency and in the substantive privacy issues implicated by 
policing. 275  Increasingly, movement groups such as Mijente, Organized 
Communities Against Deportation, Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, Communities 
United for Police Reform, and others are also organizing around law 
enforcement accountability issues and simultaneously advancing transparency as 
a chief prong of their strategy.276 Yet while organizations like Legal Aid Society 
and Erase the Database are pioneering grassroots open records initiatives to 
address secretive policing practices, the reality is that established civil liberties 
organizations are dominating the shadow docket. The outsized presence of well-
funded civil liberties organizations might therefore cast some doubt on whether 
open government strategies are truly empowering activists and movement 
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organizations or whether they chiefly reflect the priorities of non-profit 
organizations. 
Moreover, critics of the “freedom of information” framework have 
observed that open government’s “entitlement” of access to government records 
has unintended negative effects. Predictably, the flood of requests leads to 
significant delays and to de facto denials that only requesters with means and 
access to representation can afford to challenge.277 As a result, news media and 
civil society organizations represent a relative minority of requesters and FOIA 
litigants, while commercial requesters clog the system with requests for records 
that financially benefit them. 278  Though these drawbacks reflect systemic 
inequities in the open government framework, they are less apparent in the 
context of policing, where commercial interests are less prevalent (although, of 
course, still present). 
Relying on FOIA and open government to reveal secretive policing 
practices might also backfire, undermining transparency interests by prompting 
law enforcement to be less candid.279 Open government obligations might thus 
undermine, rather than advance, law enforcement transparency. In fact, David 
Pozen contended that the open government framework serves largely to 
“legitimate the lion’s share of government secrecy while delegitimating and 
debilitating government itself.”280 
These critiques sound a cautionary note about the wholehearted embrace of 
open government norms. On the one hand, experience suggests that law 
enforcement imperatives will often inevitably trump even the best-designed 
transparency mandates. On the other hand, the architecture of open government 
itself might prove unhelpful, or even counterproductive, in trying to promote 
good governance values. 
These dynamics are perhaps less concerning in the context of law 
enforcement accountability than elsewhere. The combination of judicial 
deference to law enforcement, lack of notice to defendants, and absence of 
legislative or other independent oversight mechanisms in both settings already 
fosters a lack of candor by police.281 Policing also has a tendency to rely on 
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“secret law”: though internal rules and policies provide key information about 
the law itself, they are concealed as a government secret, depriving the public 
and the legislature of the ability to scrutinize these rules.282 Secret law raises 
particularly potent questions about political checkability because it has proven 
to be resistant to oversight by the lawmaking branch.283 
Alternative mechanisms might produce better outcomes for criminal 
defendants, government agencies, and the public. For example, affirmative 
disclosure of government records might be preferable to the reactive model 
embraced by FOIA, and legislative monitoring could fulfill much of FOIA’s 
oversight function without its ideological costs.284 Affirmative obligations to 
disclose records of certain categories on an ongoing, regular basis at time 
intervals defined by statute could undoubtedly help oversight institutions, the 
public, and civil society organizations to better understand the contours of 
policing practice. Yet police agencies maintain virtually uncontested control over 
all of the information relevant to these priorities and to informed decision-
making and policy-making.285 
At the same time, police departments may not regularly disclose 
information even if they are required to do so. For example, NYPD has resisted 
disclosing data about SQF and fare evasion arrests even after the New York City 
Council required the agency to publicize the information. 286  The political 
realities highlight the need for any alternative or supplement to the open records 
system to be carefully designed with meaningful remedies. 
B. Visibility, Trust, and Legitimacy 
Public trust in police is a paramount value within criminal justice reform 
efforts and scholarship. 287  To the extent that scholars and advocates have 
considered transparency law as an aspect of criminal justice reform at all, the 
thinking has often reflected a core assumption that transparency breeds good 
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governance.288 For instance, the 2015 report from the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing recommended that police agencies should adopt 
procedural justice and transparency reforms in service of promoting public trust 
and legitimacy.289 With regard to transparency, the Task Force recommended 
that law enforcement publish their policies, aggregate data about policing, and 
communicate with the public. 290  Police chiefs across the nation likewise 
emphasize transparency as a key aspect of public trust.291 
But transparency alone does not inexorably breed trust and legitimacy.292 
The procedural justice model, for example, stresses how compliance with the 
law is “powerfully influenced by people’s subjective judgments about the 
fairness of the procedures” that the police abide by when engaging with 
civilians.293 At its core, procedural justice insists upon police ability to convey 
that they make decisions in “neutral, objective, consistent ways.”294 
The concept of visibility plays an underappreciated role in facilitating the 
goals of procedural justice. For the public to consider law enforcement 
legitimate, and for police to secure compliance with the law, decision-makers 
need both to “be fair and to be seen as being fair.”295 In other words, it’s not 
enough for police to abide by rules and procedures that are fair yet opaque. To 
promote the ultimate goal of legal compliance, procedural justice requires not 
only empirically fair procedures—a proposition that police could demonstrate 
by making their procedures public, transparent, and participatory—but also the 
public perception of fairness.296 
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Democratic policing takes a slightly different tack, suggesting that the root 
of police dysfunction is not its opacity or unfairness as such but rather its 
distanced relationship with ordinary democratic oversight mechanisms. 297 
According to this diagnosis, “virtually none” of the administrative law 
mechanisms designed to hold the executive branch in check—including 
transparency obligations—apply to police.298 Advocates of democratic policing 
and other like-minded reformers propose an analogy between law enforcement 
agencies and other executive branch agencies.299 By emphasizing the role of 
lawmaking and public participation in legitimating policing, democratic policing 
scholarship argues for redistributing the authority to oversee police to a broader 
set of actors and thus for recentering the public as the ultimate source of police 
power.300 
Both of these approaches recognize that, without deeper commitments to 
building trust and more enduring systems for oversight and democratic control, 
transparency will not legitimate police authority. But an absence of visibility also 
exacerbates mistrust: opacity is looked on with suspicion.301 
Although proponents of transparency litigation often argue that exposing 
policing practices will advance trust, there may be reason to doubt this 
assumption.302 Critics have called transparency “overvalued.”303 For one thing, 
the claim that transparency produces social trust or other desirable outcomes has 
not been the subject of much rigorous empirical examination.304 Indeed, one 
meta-analysis found that transparency’s relationship to trust is inconsistent at 
 
 297. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1. 
 298. Id. at 1843. 
 299. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1; Renan, supra note 57; Christopher 
Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (2016). 
 300. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1, at 1886–89 (describing different models 
for community engagement, including commissions, oversight boards, and notice-and-comment 
rulemaking); cf. Kitrosser, supra note 1, at 1173–74 (describing how the legislative process is engineered 
for transparency while the executive branch is designed to facilitate secrecy). 
 301. Cf. Fenster, supra note 21, at 931 (“When significant segments of the public believe that 
corruption or conspiracy permeate government, their desire for transparency becomes obsessive and 
their ability to rationally sort and interpret information suffers as a result.”); Malte Ziewitz, Governing 
Algorithms: Myth, Mess, and Methods, 41 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 3, 6 (2016) (“[O]pacity of 
operation tends to be read as another sign of influence and power.”) 
 302. See, e.g., Intervenors Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Intervention and for 
Access to Court Documents at 17, People v. Van Dyke, 17-cr-0428601 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/litigation/Van%20Dyke_2018-03-
06_intervenors_memorandum_of_law_in_support.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9DK-5WCW] (“Public 
scrutiny over the court system promotes community respect for the rule of law, provides a check on the 
activities of judges and litigants, and fosters more accurate fact finding.” (quoting A.P. v. M.E.E., 354 
Ill. App. 3d 989, 999 (1st Dist. 2004))); see also supra Part III.C.1 (describing invocation of trust in the 
context of The Stranger’s effort to unseal electronic surveillance records). 
 303. Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389 (2010); see 
also Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 100–01 (documenting how open data mandates have 
come at the expense of government’s ability to function); Samaha, supra note 42, at 922 (observing 
some of the costs of “transparency”). 
 304. Etzioni, supra note 303, at 394–95 (noting the dearth of empirical evidence). 
968 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:917 
best and inverse at worst.305 For another, several examples suggest that, in order 
to promote “accountability and responsiveness” in government, transparency 
must be paired with other avenues of public engagement.306 
Perhaps the rise of the shadow docket might be interpreted, rather than 
advancing trust, as giving voice to communities and movements that distrust 
police. 307 As Monica Bell has put it, when it comes to police, “many poor 
African Americans might see police as a legitimate authority in the ideal, and 
might even empathize with some police officers’ plight, but they find the police 
as a whole too corrupt, unpredictable, or biased to deem them trustworthy.”308 
But the transactional frame of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which focuses 
on individuals’ rights and the remedy of suppressing the fruits of unlawful 
searches and seizures, fails to truly reflect what Bell calls “legal estrangement.” 
Instead, as she notes, policing cases “send messages to groups about social 
inclusion and, indeed, social citizenship.”309 
Transparency litigation, like other civil litigation strategies, might thus 
reflect a conscious effort to dismantle, contest, and resist law enforcement 
institutions rather than to support their trustworthiness or legitimacy. This strain 
of advocacy, scholarship, and critique—what some have called “radical,” 
“progressive” or “left”—aims not to legitimate police authority but to utterly 
reconstruct the relationship between police and communities. 310 The task of 
empowering the public—in particular, the public most affected by law 
enforcement and mass incarceration—is central to this project.311 
And while one might be faulted for believing that transparency alone could 
give rise to meaningful accountability or reform, the emergence of the shadow 
docket illustrates a conviction that transparency litigation can spur “both popular 
and legislative scrutiny.”312 To the extent transparency deflates other efforts to 
encourage regulation or public participation—even if temporarily—it may be 
counterproductive.313 But in the efforts outlined above, transparency litigation—
sometimes brought by legislative actors themselves or in tandem with legislative 
strategies—tends not to exhaust the potential for public engagement but rather 
to aid it. Indeed, in light of the informational dynamics of modern policing, it is 
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difficult to imagine an effective regulatory strategy that operates without a degree 
of information-forcing. 
C. The Transparency Two-Step 
Perhaps the most significant drawback of the shadow docket is that it is a 
deeply flawed mechanism for actually reining in policing. Transparency 
litigation, like the law itself, is a tool.314 But it is not clear that it’s the right 
tool.315 
These cases are not about transparency for transparency’s sake, and 
transparency does not provide an adequate substitute for more robust and 
meaningful accountability obligations. Movements, individuals, and civil society 
organizations have turned to transparency law not because it is superior at 
accomplishing police accountability but because, given the constraints of politics 
and constitutional doctrine, it is the only viable option to get the foot in the 
courthouse door.316 Often, as the foregoing analysis underscores, litigants deploy 
transparency law to establish a foundation for further reform or accountability. 
Transparency litigation is thus an initial step on the pathway to substantive 
reform. If this diagnosis is accurate to any significant degree, it should prompt 
us not to embrace transparency as a standalone cure for what ails law 
enforcement, but to recommit to broadening the avenues for police 
accountability. 
Consider the story of police cameras. On October 20, 2014, Chicago police 
officer Jason Van Dyke shot and killed teenager Laquan McDonald.317 Van 
Dyke and several other law enforcement officers had responded to a call 
reporting an individual breaking into cars.318 According to official accounts, the 
officers had used their squad cars to box in the seventeen-year-old suspect, who 
was carrying a knife in one hand.319 A police union spokesman told the Chicago 
Sun-Times, “An officer shot him in the chest when he refused to comply with 
orders to drop the knife and continued to approach the officers.” 320  Soon 
afterwards, a whistleblower approached Craig Futterman, a law professor at the 
University of Chicago, and Jamie Kalven, an independent journalist, and told 
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them that McDonald had been retreating, not advancing; that a White male 
officer had shot McDonald as he was backing away; that the officer had “fired 
repeatedly into his body”; and that the CPD was not investigating the murder.321 
Public outrage and a “pitched legal battle doggedly pursued by local 
investigative journalists” ensued.322 Kalven filed a FOIA request for the autopsy 
report, which showed that McDonald had been shot sixteen times.323 The next 
month, Chicago’s city council approved a $5 million settlement to McDonald’s 
family, on the condition that the family not release the footage from the 
dashboard camera that recorded the murder. 324  The nondisclosure provision 
prompted public outrage, and in April, Alderman Howard Brookins called on the 
CPD to release the footage from the dashboard camera that recorded the 
murder. 325  In May 2015, freelance journalist Brandon Smith filed a FOIA 
request for the dashcam video.326 And in November, only hours after Van Dyke 
was charged with first-degree murder, the video was released to the public, 
showing Van Dyke opening fire six seconds after getting out of his squad car as 
McDonald was walking away.327 
The story of Laquan McDonald is not a righteous story about the power of 
government transparency to expose wrongdoing and promote accountability. 
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Rather, Laquan McDonald’s tragic and untimely death exposed how deep 
pathologies within CPD narrowed the opportunities to hold Van Dyke 
accountable and thus compelled advocates to turn to transparency law to expose 
the wrongdoing. In their initial blog post, Kalven and Futterman expressed 
exhaustion with the endless repetition of a cycle of impunity. “A black man is 
shot by a Chicago police officer. Police sources at the scene say the shooting was 
justified. The Independent Police Review Authority says it is investigating the 
incident. Then silence.”328 Only if the truth would come out, they seemed to say, 
would accountability be possible. 
Systemic reform has followed from the McDonald shooting to address both 
the racist police violence in Chicago and the police culture of secrecy that 
embraced coverups and other attempts to conceal widespread wrongdoing. The 
State of Illinois sued the Chicago Police Department for a pattern and practice 
of using excessive force in Black and Latinx communities in Chicago.329 The 
state pointed out that the CPD exhibited a disproportionately high use of force 
against African-American and Latinx people, and that its Independent Police 
Review Authority sustained a disproportionately low percentage of misconduct 
complaints—only 2 percent.330 In 2016, reformer Kim Foxx was elected as the 
State’s Attorney for Cook County.331 In 2019, a federal court approved a historic 
consent decree to reform the Chicago Police Department.332 
Those reforms undoubtedly flowed from the public outrage over 
McDonald’s murder. But they also illustrate that the correct response to abuses 
of police authority is not to rely on transparency as a remedy, but rather to use 
all the tools at our disposal to dismantle and reconstruct law enforcement: 




Investigative methods are not at the fringe of what communities are 
concerned about with regard to law enforcement: they are the core. SQF, Broken 
Windows, and their digital counterparts have prompted pushback from civil 
society and social movements not because they are symptomatic of broader 
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distrust and estrangement from police; they are the root cause of distrust and 
estrangement. Against this background, it is all the more important for 
individuals and organizations to be able to confront these programs, to 
understand how they work, and to hold them in check. While transparency 
litigation has become an essential tool for movements, advocacy groups, and 
journalists alike to address police secrecy, this Section begins to sketch out how 
other options might be better suited to more directly promote accountability in 
policing. 
A. Transparency Outside the Shadow Docket 
In Section 1983 actions and in consent decrees with police departments, 
courts have been instituting a variety of transparency-oriented reforms to remedy 
patterns of unconstitutional police conduct: body cameras, court-appointed 
monitoring, town hall meetings, and engagement with civil society and 
community organizations. In so doing, courts are working to make policing more 
“politically checkable”—both more amenable to oversight and more 
democratically legitimate. 
These initiatives illustrate that transparency remedies need not be restricted 
to transparency litigation. For instance, the dual strategy employed in the SQF 
litigation focused on extracting the UF-250 data to demonstrate a pattern of 
racially biased policing. But the court-ordered remedies also focused on 
transparency beyond the UF-250. Judge Scheindlin ordered the UF-250 to be 
revised to include additional fields, including an explanation of the officer’s 
basis for reasonable suspicion and the explanation for why a frisk was 
performed.334 The UF-250 also had to include a “tear-off” portion to be given to 
“each stopped person at the end of the encounter.”335 Beyond the UF-250, Judge 
Scheindlin also ordered NYPD to conduct a pilot study of body-worn cameras 
to determine whether they were effective at deterring unconstitutional SQF 
encounters.336 
The district court’s approach to transparency went beyond individual 
documentation, however. Noting that community participation was a “vital part 
of a sustainable remedy,” Judge Scheindlin ordered the parties to participate in a 
joint remedial process for six to nine months that would center on “input from 
those who are most affected by the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk.”337 The court 
ordered the Facilitator of the joint remedial process to convene “town hall” 
meetings in each borough at which the public could participate. 338 And the 
output of that joint remedial process also emphasized the need for “greater 
respect, transparency, and accountability” to facilitate public confidence and 
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trust in the police.339 Over NYPD’s objections, the district court also ordered the 
appointment of an independent monitor. 
The impact of the Floyd remedies opinion is somewhat uncertain, 
especially given the “kerfuffle” that ensued when the City appealed and argued 
that Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality had been compromised. 340  The point, 
however, is that the remedies opinion lays the groundwork for civil remedies 
geared toward enhancing public transparency and accountability. The same is 
true for consent decrees, which some commentators have suggested play an 
important role in promoting community engagement and democratizing the 
police. 341  Recognizing the critical role of law enforcement transparency to 
political checkability and to the protection of Fourth Amendment rights and 
values should spur similar initiatives. 
B. Procurement Reform 
Constraining law enforcement’s opportunities to procure new police 
technologies is another potentially significant avenue for reform.342 Legislatures 
could use the budgeting process to gain leverage in support of police 
transparency, requiring police to make certain information available in order to 
procure new technologies or pay the vendors who supply them. By monitoring 
and placing conditions on police expenditures, institutions can engage in a form 
of ex ante oversight that has otherwise been largely fruitless. 
An emerging movement for community control of surveillance technology 
may provide a template for future legislation. In a model bill, the ACLU suggests 
that jurisdictions adopt reforms that require legislative approval for the 
acquisition of any new surveillance technology and that law enforcement publish 
impact assessments and surveillance use policies prior to adopting a new 
technology.343 Similar laws have passed in Nashville, Seattle, Cambridge, and 
elsewhere.344 
 
 339. BELEN, supra note 160, at 11. 
 340. Emily Chiang, Reviving the Declaratory Judgment: A New Path to Structural Reform, 63 
BUFF. L. REV. 549, 604–06 (2015) (explaining the backlash to Judge Scheindlin’s opinion); see also 
Anil Kalhan, Stop and Frisk, Judicial Independence, and the Ironies of Improper Appearances, 27 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1043 (2014) (critically assessing the dismissal of Judge Scheindlin). 
 341. See, e.g., Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community 
Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2016); see also 
Noah Kupferberg, Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent Decrees, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 129 (2008). 
 342. See Crump, supra note 1. 
 343. Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) Model Bill, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/community-control-over-police-surveillance-ccops-model-bill 
[https://perma.cc/HKB8-JHVY]. 
 344. Mike Maharrey, Nashville Metro Council Passes Ordinance Taking First Step Toward 
Limiting the Surveillance State, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR. BLOG (June 13, 2017), 
https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2017/06/nashville-metro-council-passes-ordinance-taking-
first-step-toward-limiting-the-surveillance-state/ [https://perma.cc/KLF2-MX8E]; Seattle Set to Decide 
 
974 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  109:917 
Participatory budgeting might promote this principle even more effectively 
by engaging a community-centered approach to procurement. Initially developed 
by the Workers Party in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in the late 1980s, participatory 
budgeting involves unelected citizens in “budgetary decision-making.” 345 
Generally implemented on a neighborhood or community-wide basis, 
participatory budgeting calls upon residents to determine how to spend a portion 
of a city’s budget. 346  In New York City, for instance, a majority of city 
councilmembers allocate a portion of their districts’ budgets to be determined by 
the community itself.347 One premise of participatory budgeting is that it may 
redirect funds to where the community determines they are most urgently 
needed. 348  The Movement for Black Lives, for example, has called for 
participatory budgeting processes to “integrate human rights” and prioritize the 
needs of poor Black and Brown communities.349  
C. Community Control 
In the absence of Fourth Amendment safeguards, it is all the more critical 
that alternative institutions might be able to check the police. 350  Those 
institutions may include legislative bodies, civilian oversight boards, or 
community institutions. Redistributing the authority and power to oversee 
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policing to a broader set of institutions has the potential to check police 
misconduct more effectively, as Rachel Harmon observes.351 
Legislatures in states and cities across the nation have responded to 2020’s 
uprising against police violence by taking action intended to limit police abuses 
and promote law enforcement transparency.352 Yet legislative bodies have had 
mixed success in exposing police activity, as New York’s Police Reporting Law 
and fare evasion reporting law suggest.353 And where legislatures have acted to 
reconsider, reveal, or put an end to unconstitutional police practices, they have 
often not been as aggressive as affected communities would like. 354  By 
compelling transparency rather than substantive reform, legislatures appear to 
hew to the fiction that “Transparency is More Powerful than Regulations.”355 
Community advisory bodies might serve two functions at once, by spurring 
more action by city councils and by enhancing the representation of communities 
who have historically been excluded from decision-making on policing. ACLU’s 
CCOPS model bill, for instance, calls on cities to appoint a community advisory 
committee on surveillance that reflects the makeup of the city and that “ensure[s] 
communities that have historically been disproportionately subjected to 
government surveillance are well-represented.”356  
More “movement-driven” visions have called for community control 
mechanisms that “truly shift[] power” to affected communities. 357  The 
Movement for Black Lives, for instance, calls for direct community control of 
law enforcement, not simply non-binding, advisory input.358 These calls surface 
important and oft-controversial debates about the institutional design of civilian 
or community control.359 For instance, who ought to appoint the members of a 
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civilian review board, should its recommendations be binding, and ought it have 
subpoena authority to investigate allegations of misconduct? 360  Importantly, 
battles over civilian control also show that the composition of oversight 
institutions matters to police acceptance of and compliance with those mandates. 
In other words, police may be so hostile to community-led efforts to control their 
behavior that community oversight institutions are even less effective than 
legislative bodies. On the other hand, community-led oversight might be more 
aggressive than “technocrats” in both seeking access to the information 
necessary to understand—and put a stop to—policing strategies that perpetuate 
racial inequity.361  
Some have expressed doubts about whether community control is truly the 
best remedy for law enforcement. 362  Indeed, even within the movement to 
“democratize” law enforcement, there is substantial disagreement about the 
proper scope and extent of lay community involvement as opposed to expert-led 
policy-making.363 Resolving these debates is far beyond the scope of this Article. 
For now, suffice it to say that the particular design choices made in crafting 
community and civilian control mechanisms affect the extent to which those 
mechanisms can promote the flow of information to the public. 
D. New Expert Oversight Institutions 
As law enforcement adopts predictive policing and other programmatic 
surveillance methods, the lessons of government secrecy scholarship are 
increasingly relevant, perhaps surprisingly so. In a literal sense, cooperation 
among state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies blurs the distinctions 
between different law enforcement actors, particularly in contexts such as 
immigration and national security.364 The increasing integration of federal, state 
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and local law enforcement priorities, and the turn toward data-driven 
investigative methods, help to explain why local and state oversight institutions 
have struggled to conduct effective oversight of these activities. As Matthew 
Waxman has observed, state and local oversight mechanisms for intelligence-
gathering or other surreptitious investigative methods are largely 
underdeveloped.365 At the state and local level, few institutions have regulatory 
or oversight capacity comparable to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board, federal Inspectors General, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence Civil Liberties Protection Office, or the alphabet soup of other 
agencies and offices with some authority to oversee intelligence.366 Even where 
local police have dedicated oversight institutions, such as Inspectors General, 
those institutions may have narrow authority or fractious relationships with 
police unions.367 
In light of the informational dynamics of modern policing, it is all the more 
critical that expert institutions should be empowered to conduct ongoing audits 
and monitoring of police surveillance. Some jurisdictions have already 
successfully explored these methodologies: recently, a state agency in California 
issued a scathing audit report of that state’s gang database, CalGang, and a 
similar report in Chicago has spurred a far-reaching conversation about the future 
of that city’s gang database.368 
Ex post monitoring and auditing is especially important in the context of 
Big Data policing because of concerns about data quality, accuracy, and privacy 
issues.369 Even though auditing may not be able to identify every reason why an 
algorithm reaches an impermissible decision—whether it is biased, 
discriminatory, or just plain wrong—it remains an important strategy to examine 
the “actual impact” of algorithms in the real world.370 
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The SQF and gang policing examples illustrate that police might not always 
comply with disclosure or auditing mandates. But perfect adherence is not the 
goal. Institutionalizing transparency is important because it introduces new ways 
of checking police conduct and reintroduces methods of oversight in an area that 
has been outside of the frame. Intangible, privatized, and secretive investigative 
methods thus raise concerns that accountability problems familiar to the national 
security context might bleed over into local and state law enforcement as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Law enforcement agencies have never had such easy access to technologies 
of surveillance as they do today. And it has never been so easy for police to 
operate in secret, without democratic accountability or public input. As the legal 
options for checking the police dwindle, transparency law has played an outsized 
role in prompting substantive reform and in mobilizing social change. 
But making policing visible is about much more than exposing aggregate 
data or publishing a list of intrusive police techniques. Visibility is a critical 
element of democratic oversight by elected officials, legislative bodies, and 
communities affected by surveillance. The proliferation of new technologies 
should prompt us to ask not just what rules ought to constrain the police, but 
what we need to know in order to decide what the rules ought to be. And it should 
prompt us to reconsider the extent to which the informational dynamics of 
modern policing, fueled by private-sector vendors and an ever-increasing hunger 
for more data, intentionally stand in the way of effective oversight. These 
informational dynamics do not only reflect public policy failures: they reflect a 
fundamental challenge to the project of police reform and to the democratic 
legitimacy of policing decisions. 
